When the WTO Works, and How It Fails by Bradford, Anu
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2010 
When the WTO Works, and How It Fails 
Anu Bradford 
Columbia Law School, abradf@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1963 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
When the WTO Works, and How It Fails
ANU BRADFORD
This Article seeks to explain when an international legal frame-
work like the WTO can facilitate international cooperation and
when it fails to do so. Using an empirical inquiry into different
agreements that the WTO has attempted to facilitate - specifi-
cally, intellectual property and antitrust regulation - it reveals
more general principles about why the WTO can facilitate
agreement in some situations and not in others. Comparing the
successful conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement and the failed at-
tempts to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement indicates that in-
ternational cooperation is likely to emerge when the interests of
powerful states align and when concentrated interest groups
within those states actively support cooperation. The comparison
further suggests that the WTO provides an optimal forum for co-
operation when states need to rely on cross-issue linkages to
overcome existing distributional conflicts, when the underlying
issue calls for an enforcement mechanism, or when both the net
benefits of the agreement and the opportunity costs of non-
agreement are high. Contrasting the key differences between IP
and antitrust cooperation, this Article disputes the widely held
view that the strategic situations underlying IP and antitrust co-
operation are similar and that the conclusion of the TRIPS
Agreement is a relevant precedent predicting a successful WTO
negotiation of antitrust or a host of other new regulatory issues.
Given the ongoing changes in the economic and political land-
scape, cooperation in the WTO is even more challenging today.
It is possible that - absent institutional reforms - the WTO's
recent expansion may well have met its limits.
* Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. Helpful comments were pro-
vided by Travis Bradford, William Burke-White, Katerina Linos, Jide Nzelibe, Eric Posner, and
the workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Northwestern University Law School,
and the ASIL International Economic Law Interest Group Research Colloquium at UCLA School
of Law. The author thanks Hanna Chung and Amanda Gomez for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
International efforts to seek regulatory convergence produce striking-
ly different results even in situations where the economic implications
of the regulatory regimes appear similar. For instance, the enforcement
of antitrust laws and the protection of intellectual property (IP) rights
across jurisdictions have enormous implications for major economic
powers and their domestic constituencies, creating pressures for interna-
tional cooperation. Yet the efforts to harmonize the two regulatory re-
gimes have followed very different paths. The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)' was a conten-
2tious matter with enormous distributional consequences. Nevertheless,
states agreed to incorporate IP rights into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1994.3 In contrast, various attempts to launch WTO negotia-
tions on antitrust have all failed.4 Instead, states have sought to mini-
mize negative externalities of decentralized antitrust enforcement by
engaging in case-by-case enforcement cooperation and by developing
recommendations and best practices to foster voluntary convergence of
their respective antitrust regimes.5
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS].
2. See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Note by the Secretariat: Meeting of Negotiating Group of 25 and 29 November 1991,
MTN.GNG/TRIPS/4 (Dec. 9, 1991) (reporting that there were still major disagreements about
special treatment for developing countries); Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights, Note by the Secretariat: Meeting of the Negotiating Group of 22 No-
vember 1990, MTN.GNG/NG 1l/28 (Nov. 29, 1990) (indicating that, years later, parties still had
substantial disagreements about special treatment for developing countries, national commitments
against discrimination, the availability of reservations, and the right scope of the agreement); Ne-
gotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Note by the Secretari-
at: Meeting of 25 March 1987, MTN.GNG/NGl 1/1 (Apr. 10, 1987) (reporting the many diverse
concerns relating to intellectual property rights expressed by the negotiating parties during the
initial meeting).
3. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 11(2), Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (binding WTO member states to all
annexed legal agreements, including TRIPS).
4. See, e.g., PHILIP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE WTO 45-66 (2003). Most
recently, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled in Cancun in 2003 due to the resistance
of the developing countries. On August 1, 2004, the WTO General Council decided officially to
drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round negotiation agenda. See World Trade Organization
General Council, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug.
2, 2004).
5. See, e.g., Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and Limits
on the Road Towards International Competition Governance, 8 COMPETITION & CHANGE 223,
225-27 (2004); Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality and
Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 973 (2003); Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Gov-
ernance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 235-36
(2003).
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The successful incorporation of IP rights into the WTO cultivated a
false sense of optimism regarding the inherently flexible boundaries of
the WTO, fostering a belief that the trade regime is capable of accom-
modating a host of new issues, including antitrust, investment, corrup-
tion, labor, and environment, among others. 6 Thus far, scholars have
concentrated on assessing the normative desirability of expanding the
WTO's mandate to these new issue areas. The most cohesive attempt to
do this took place when the American Journal of International Law
published a symposium issue on the boundaries of the WTO. In the
symposium, several prominent trade scholars sought to develop criteria
that WTO member states could use to assess whether any given issue
belongs to the trade institution or whether some other entity should reg-
ulate it.
This Article examines the institutional boundaries of the WTO from a
descriptive perspective. It seeks to identify conditions that explain and
predict when an international legal framework like the WTO can ad-
vance international cooperation and when it is incapable of doing so. It
departs from the existing scholarly debate on the substantive scope of
the WTO, which focuses on the question of the normative desirability of
expanding the boundaries of the WTO and the development of criteria
in selecting issues for the WTO to address. Instead, this Article focuses
on the feasibility of WTO agreements, seeking to understand when the
WTO works and when it does not, given the characteristics of the un-
derlying issue of cooperation, constraints that stem from power politics
and domestic political economy, and the comparative institutional ad-
vantages of the WTO. Thus, the goal is to define the institutional scope
of the WTO by isolating the predominant variables that determine when
an agreement within this regime is likely to materialize and when states
are likely to turn to alternative regulatory regimes instead.
The Article begins with a standard assumption that international co-
operation is more likely to emerge when the interests of powerful states
align and when concentrated and influential interest groups within those
states support the agreement. These factors are often used to explain
why international cooperation in a given instance has been successful.
Without their presence, the prospects for a WTO agreement - or any
other international treaty - are dim. These factors fail to explain, how-
ever, when powerful states choose to cooperate in the WTO as opposed
to another international legal framework.
This Article asserts that the WTO offers the optimal legal framework
for cooperation in the presence of three conditions. First, the WTO is a
6. See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 28,
29 (2002).
7. See generally Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
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particularly useful vehicle for cooperation when states need to, and are
able to, rely on "issue linkages" to overcome existing distributional con-
flicts. Second, the WTO is a preferred forum when the underlying issue
is prone to defection and when sustainable cooperation therefore calls
for an enforcement mechanism. Finally, states are more likely to pursue
cooperation in the WTO when the high benefits of cooperation exceed
the high costs of formal, institutionalized cooperation.
The Article then moves on to examine these predictors of successful
cooperation in the context of two in-depth case studies - the successful
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement and the failed attempts to negotiate
a WTO antitrust agreement. Five fundamental differences between the
strategic situations characterize these two areas of cooperation. First, the
great economic powers all supported the TRIPS Agreement, but they
disagreed on the need to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement. Second,
influential interest groups within these Great Powers9 unequivocally en-
dorsed the TRIPS Agreement, while there has been little, if any, inter-
est-group support for the international antitrust agreement.'o Third, the
Great Powers successfully employed transfer payments in the form of
issue linkages to address the unequal distributional consequences of the
TRIPS Agreement. In contrast, ex ante uncertainty regarding the win-
ners and losers under the prospective antitrust agreement obstructed
states' ability to devise these types of issue linkages and, as a result,
compromised their ability to solve the distributional conflict." Fourth,
8. See Sylvia Ostry, Intellectual Property Protection in the WTO: Major Issues in the Millen-
nium Round, Address at the Fraser Institute Conference 3 (Apr. 19, 1999), available at
http://tinyurl.com/2ato8kr; cf Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False
Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 383, 405-10 (2007) (explaining why the United States
and the EU have different views on incorporating antitrust laws into the WTO).
9. As used in this Article, "Great Power" refers to a state that has the ability to exert its influ-
ence - military, economic, political, or cultural - on a global scale. In connection with interna-
tional trade, a country's status as a great power is predominantly determined by the extent of its
economic influence over other states.
10. See, e.g., Sylvia Ostry, Convergence and Sovereignty: Policy Scope for Compromise?, in
COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION 52, 55-57 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000); INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & Bus. & INDUS. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE OECD, ICC/BIAC
COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE US INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (ICPAC) 2, 6, 10 (June 5, 2000), http://tinyurl.com/25xllhm [hereinafter ICC/BIAC
COMMENTS] ("ICC and BIAC agree the WTO is not an appropriate forum for the review of pri-
vate restraints and that the WTO should not develop new competition laws under its framework at
this time.").
11. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 422-29; Christina L. Davis, International Institutions and
Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
153, 156, 165 (2004); cf Raquel Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo
Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1146 (1991) (ob-
serving that interest groups are less likely to push hard for a reform when it is difficult to predict
who will benefit from the outcome); Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO:
The Lesson from Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 950-51 (2003) (postulating that an
agreement on international antitrust will be difficult without an effective method for transfer
6 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
defection from a prospective agreement was a concern underlying the
TRIPS negotiations, rendering the WTO and its Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) particularly attractive. Conversely, the likelihood of
defection and, hence, the need for an enforcement mechanism was a
lesser concern in antitrust negotiations, diminishing the need to pursue
cooperation within the WTO.12 Finally, the benefits of cooperating in
the WTO and the opportunity costs of not doing so were significantly
higher with respect to IP rights than in the case of antitrust, thus rein-
forcing the case for the TRIPS Agreement and rendering the case for a
WTO antitrust agreement less compelling.'
By unveiling the key differences between these two areas of coopera-
tion, this Article challenges the widely held view that the strategic situa-
tions underlying IP and antitrust cooperation are very similar and that
the TRIPS Agreement would, therefore, offer an instructive precedent
for successful WTO antitrust negotiations. 14 A closer examination of the
two areas of cooperation reveals that the TRIPS and antitrust negotia-
tions have, in fact, very little in common. Given that the dynamics un-
derlying antitrust cooperation would - at least intuitively - appear to
be most similar to those underlying cooperation on IP rights, the two
case studies also cast doubt on the ability of the TRIPS Agreement to
provide a template in other proposed areas of cooperation, such as envi-
ronmental protection or labor law, where the political economy condi-
tions seem further removed from those underlying the TRIPS negotia-
tions.
The two case studies also challenge certain standard assumptions on
international cooperation. The WTO rules are the result of consensus,
suggesting that any given agreement ought to be Pareto-improving15 for
all of the organization's members. If an agreement were to leave any
state worse off, that state would use its veto rights to block that agree-
ment.' 6 This is consistent with any rational-choice model that assumes
that states pursue international cooperation only when benefits from
such cooperation exceed the costs involved. The examination of the
TRIPS and antitrust negotiations, however, reveals that certain zero-sum
payments).
12. Bradford, supra note 8, at 434.
13. Id. at 434-35.
14. Andrew Guzman has developed a most detailed argument on why the TRIPS negotiations
should be instructive to the antitrust negotiations. See Guzman, supra note 11.
15. An agreement that is Pareto-improving makes at least one party better off, but makes no
party worse off. See ALAN V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 204 (2006).
16. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow ofLaw or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and
Outcomes in the GA2T/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 345 (2002). Similarly, a state might block
agreements that resulted in positive-sum outcomes if such an agreement inequitably distributed
the benefits among the trading partners. Id.
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agreements that harm some states - such as TRIPS - do materialize
within the WTO, whereas win-win agreements that many consider to be
Pareto-improving for all states - such as antitrust - can be unsuccess-
ful.17 One of the goals of this Article is to explain why this happens.
Similarly, conventional wisdom suggests that cooperation is less likely
in the presence of stark distributional conflicts or incentives to defect.
Yet, this Article argues that it is exactly in the presence of these two
conditions that a WTO agreement is most likely to emerge. Consequent-
ly, a more nuanced theory on cooperation within the WTO is necessary.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the institutional ca-
pacity of the WTO, laying out key predictors of when the WTO can ad-
vance international cooperation and when it fails to do so. Part II exam-
ines these predictors through a case study that focuses on two prominent
WTO negotiations - the successful TRIPS negotiations and the failed
antitrust negotiations - and identifies the key differences between the
two areas of cooperation. These differences, the Article contends, cap-
ture the very conditions that allow us to predict whether cooperation in
the WTO is feasible. The conclusion discusses the prospects of future
cooperation in the WTO, applying the lessons from the case studies to
the changing political and economic landscape in which WTO negotia-
tions are likely to take place in the future.
I. A THEORY OF COOPERATION IN THE WTO
Scholars often hail the WTO as the most effective of international in-
stitutions.' 8 With a broad membership and an extensive set of interna-
tionally binding obligations, the WTO has ensured that states open
their borders by lowering tariffs and removing various non-tariff bar-
riers that restrict international trade. More open trade has secured
worldwide economic growth and increased prosperity across the
global markets. While trade liberalization has its critics,'9 few would
17. See Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing
World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT'L ORG. 315 (1995) (surmising that TRIPS should
have been harder to agree to than antitrust provisions as all states had something to gain from at
least some minimum set of antitrust laws).
18. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
303, 321 (2004) ("The most effective dispute resolution procedures are found within the WTO.");
Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 13
(2006) ("The most effective and important international institution today is the World Trade Or-
ganization . . . ."); Carlos Manuel Vzquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO:
Some Similarities and Diferences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 587, 587 (2004) ("Among in-
ternational organizations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is widely credited with having
the most effective dispute settlement system.").
19. See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM (2007); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
2010] 7
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suggest that the WTO has not accomplished its primary mission of
reducing obstacles to international trade. Many attribute the WTO's
success to its ability to enforce commitments through its DSM. This
sets the WTO apart from most other international institutions, which
lack the means to hold states accountable for the breach of their obliga-
tions. Unlike much of international law, WTO obligations constitute
"hard law" enforced by sanctions. This feature has also cultivated a per-
ception of the distinct effectiveness of WTO agreements, resulting in
pressures to incorporate a number of new issues into the WTO.
The attempts to link various "nontrade" issues into the WTO have
become a subject of extensive debate and controversy. 20 There is no
shortage of advocates - whether diplomats or governments, scholars,
private interests, or non-governmental organizations - arguing for or
against the expansion of the traditional trade agenda to new areas of co-
operation.21 These disagreements have derailed ministerial meetings and
collapsed negotiations, undermining the credibility of the WTO and, at
times, calling into question the entire mission of the trade regime.22 Un-
fortunately, the extensive debates have all failed to provide explicit cri-
teria or a coherent analytical framework for assessing the optimal scope
of the WTO.
Any normative discussion on the boundaries of the WTO needs a sol-
id positive foundation that includes a nuanced understanding of the in-
stitutional capacity of the WTO. International relations literature has
generated ambivalent and often contradictory insights into the situations
that allow international institutions to facilitate cooperation. 23 This of-
fers only limited guidance on the circumstances in which agreements
59 (2002).
20. See John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem - Comments on Five Texts, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 118, 118 n.1 (2002) (referring to numerous instances where nontrade issues
threatened to derail WTO-related negotiations). Jackson gives an overview of several scholars'
perspectives on the proper place of nontrade issues in WTO negotiations, then gives his own take
on where the boundaries should be. See generally id. at 118-25.
21. See id. at 118-20 (summarizing several authors' viewpoints on what is appropriate subject
matter for trade negotiations); David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 5, 5 (2002).
22. See Jackson, supra note 20, at 118.
23. See Daniel Y. Kono, Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade
Cooperation, 69 J. POL. 746, 746 (2007). The three primary views on the role of institutions offer
very different predictions on the WTO's ability to foster agreements among states. See id. The
most pessimistic views of international cooperation claim that institutions are irrelevant and una-
ble to constrain states. More optimistic advocates of institutions claim that institutions exert inde-
pendent influence on states, constraining states' self-interested behavior and subverting interna-
tional anarchy that would otherwise prevail. The third view takes the middle road, claiming that
institutions are constrained by the underlying structure of state interests but that they can still mit-
igate market failures that stem from the anarchic system of international relations. See id.
[Vol. 5 1:1
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are likely to emerge in the WTO.24 The discussion below seeks to fill
that gap by identifying the most essential conditions that determine
whether WTO agreements are likely to succeed or fail. Part I.A discuss-
es when international cooperation is generally feasible. Part I.B focuses
on when such cooperation is likely to take place in the WTO.
A. When Is International Cooperation Feasible?
Two preconditions must be present for any international cooperation
to emerge, irrespective of the institutional form that such cooperation
ultimately takes. First, powerful states must agree on the need for coop-
eration and the form that it will take. Second, powerful interest groups
within those states must support this cooperation. While these condi-
tions apply across the international institutional landscape, they also
form a starting point for assessing the feasibility of a WTO agreement.
Even though a de facto consensus among all states forms the basis for
WTO rule-making, in practice the legislative outcomes often reflect the
underlying power structures of the member states.25 In the WTO con-
text, power refers to the relative market size of each state. A state with a
large domestic market is a more attractive trading partner than a state
with a smaller domestic market. It can, thus, extract more in return for
agreeing to open its domestic market to new trading partners or for in-
26creasing market access commitments to its existing trading partners.
Large economies generally benefit from greater internal trade opportu-
nities.27 Small states are, therefore, more dependent on the WTO for
trade opportunities and less able to exert pressure by threatening to
close their markets. For instance, the prospect of Guatemala closing its
market to the United States is far less damaging to the United States
than the converse prospect of Guatemala losing the opportunity to ex-
port to the United States. This variance in the opportunity costs of mar-
ket closure shifts the balance of power further toward the large econo-
-28mies.
The United States and the European Union (EU) are the unequivocal
powers in the WTO system, based on the size of their domestic mar-
kets. 29 While their relative economic dominance is gradually diminish-
ing as emerging economies such as China and India continue to grow,
24. See id. at 746.
25. See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 346.
26. See id. at 347. Any given liberalization measure thus gives greater benefits to a smaller




29. Id. at 348.
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the United States and the EU together still account for one-third of all
world imports in both manufactured goods and commercial services.30
In addition, the combined GDP of the United States and the EU still
constitutes forty percent of the world's total GDP.
The Great Powers can take advantage of less powerful states' de-
pendence in several ways. At one extreme, Great Powers can resort to
coercive tactics. In the trade domain, coercion has typically consisted of
economic sanctions - or threats thereof - or withdrawal of economic
benefits, such as removal of a country's Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) status, which allows it to benefit from more favorable tariff
schemes.32 The Great Powers can also use selective incentives and con-
ditional benefits to persuade less powerful countries to adopt their pre-
ferred trade policies. They can negotiate conditional trade agreements or
use their economic leverage through international institutions such as
the World Bank or International Monetary Fund.33 The Great Powers
often extend economic assistance to developing countries on the condi-
tion that those countries adopt progressive economic policies and carry
out certain institutional reforms.34 These tactics steer less powerful
economies toward regulatory regimes that the Great Powers prefer.
30. See World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles for the EU and the U.S. (Mar. 2010),
http://tinyurl.com/36thnph. The United States and the EU collectively accounted for 31.5% of
merchandise imports and 33.8% of commercial services imports in 2008.
31. See World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, Gross Domestic Product 2008,
http://tinyurl.com/yg5fsj. The United States' share of total world imports was 13.2% of merchan-
dised goods and 10.3% of commercial services. World Trade Organization, supra note 30. The
EU's shares were 18.4% and 23.5%, respectively. Id. In 2008, the United States' GDP was $14.2
trillion and EU's 2008 GDP was $18.3 trillion, in nominal terms. Id. The total world 2008 GDP
was approximately $60.5 trillion. See id. Compare that with 1994, when the Uruguay Round, in-
cluding the TRIPS negotiations, was closed, the combined merchandise imports to the United
States and the EU constituted forty percent of the world total merchandised imports and their
combined GDP represented nearly fifty percent of the total world GDP. See id.
32. See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 792-93
(2001) (characterizing the WTO's enforcement mechanisms as, in effect, trade sanctions); Jan
Vandenberghe, On Carrots and Sticks: The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policy, 13 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REv. 561, 570 (2008) (discussing the EU's use of its GSP system to incentivize
and punish trading partners); see also Press Release, European Commission, Promoting Core La-
bour Standards: Commission Grants Additional Tariff Preferences to Sri Lanka and Initiates an
Inquiry into Labour Rights Violations in Belarus 1 (Jan. 7, 2004), http://tinyurl.com/2vxp37k
(noting that GSP benefits for Belarus may be temporarily withdrawn due to alleged violations of
International Labour Organisation conventions).
33. See Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, in CHALLENGES TO THE WORLD
BANK AND IMF: DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES 55 (Ariel Buira ed., 2003), available at
http://tinyurl.com/25xd29b (noting that the IMF imposes conditions on access to IMF funds and
considering the impact of those conditions on developing countries); Sophie Meunier & Kalypso
Nicolaidis, The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 906, 913
(2006) (discussing the EU's frequent use of conditionality in accession negotiations with potential
new EU member states).
34. See, e.g., Robert H. Edwards, Jr. et al., International Investment, Development, and Pri-
vatization, 33 INT'L LAW. 383, 384-85 (2001) (discussing the African Growth and Opportunity
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Even if the Great Powers agree on the need to cooperate, they are
likely to devote their limited resources to pursuing cooperation on issues
that offer them political gains. 35 The prospect of producing concrete
benefits for discrete and influential domestic interest groups maximizes
political rents from cooperation for these nations' decision makers. In-
terest groups are likely to support an international agreement when ex-
pected benefits of the agreement are concentrated and costs are dif-
fuse.36 Concentrated benefits stimulate organized activity, as the
beneficiaries of the agreement seek to institutionalize their expected
gains. At the same time, when the costs of an agreement fall on a large
number of stakeholders, their individual stake in opposing the agree-
ment is not high enough to motivate the formation of an effective coali-
tion opposing the agreement. Thus, the agreement is more likely to ma-
terialize in the presence of organized activity supporting the agreement
and in the absence of a tight counter-coalition challenge.37
B. When Does Cooperation Emerge in the WTO?
Even when the Great Powers and influential domestic interest groups
within those powers support international cooperation, it is not evident
that states find it rational to cooperate within the WTO. At times, states
pursue cooperation in another multilateral, multi-issue framework3 8 or
within a single-issue organization. 39 At other times, states regard bilat-
eral cooperation as sufficient. 40 The discussion below examines the
Act); Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. S349, S392-93 (1992) (discussing the IMF and World Bank's work with de-
veloping countries); USAID History, USAID (2009),
http://www.usaid.gov/aboutusaid/usaidhist.html (discussing American foreign aid policies in the
twentieth century).
35. Governments negotiating international agreements are assumed to be motivated by both
public welfare and public choice considerations. See generally Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom,
Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration, 31 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 203 (1971); Dani Rodrik, Political Economy of Trade Policy, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Gene Grossman & Kenneth Rogoffeds., 2d ed. 1995).
36. James Q. Wilson, The Politics ofRegulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
37. See id.
38. Efforts to pursue international antitrust cooperation have also taken place, for instance, in
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). See, e.g., Jenny, supra note 5, at 981 (noting
cooperation on antitrust issues has been affected through both the OECD and UNCTAD); Piilola,
supra note 5, at 235-37 (discussing the possibility of creating an international antitrust frame-
work through the OECD).
39. States also continue to cooperate on IP issues in the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO). In the absence of progress in the WTO, states have pursued international antitrust
cooperation in the International Competition Network (ICN). Budzinski, supra note 5, at 224.
40. See generally Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of In-
ternational Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323 (2008).
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conditions under which the WTO can facilitate regulatory convergence
and the conditions under which states prefer other regimes. It argues
that the WTO offers the most advantageous institutional setting for co-
operation in the presence of three key attributes: first, when deep distri-
butional conflict calls for strategic linkages across issues to forge an
agreement; second, when a high likelihood of defection calls for moni-
toring and enforcement provisions; and, finally, when the availability of
high net benefits exceeds the high costs of long and cumbersome WTO
negotiations.
The WTO can facilitate the conclusion of international agreements by
enabling states to negotiate transfer payments across different issues. If
an agreement on a single-issue area, by itself, is not feasible, states can
broaden the scope for a compromise by strategically linking a contested
issue to other items on the trade agenda. Issue linkage constitutes a side
payment where winning states compensate losing states to convince
them to sign on to the agreement.4 1 Extending the negotiation agenda
increases the likelihood that all states can gain from an agreement that is
part of the package. Thus, issue linkages provide an opportunity to miti-
gate distributional conflicts, opening up new possibilities for efficient
agreements.42
Issue linkages are particularly helpful in overcoming domestic re-
sistance to an international agreement.43 Broadening the negotiation
agenda counteracts protectionist coalitions by mobilizing countervailing
forces that support trade liberalization. When negotiating additional is-
sues, new coalitions emerge to counter the protectionist sentiments, of-
fering governments political rents that can exceed the costs that the pro-
tectionist coalition incurs." Grouping multiple issues in a single
negotiation also constrains the ability of a single ministry to block nego-
tiations. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture in France would at all
times resist an international agreement that curtailed France's ability to
41. See Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, An Economic Theory of Mutually Advanta-
geous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations, 33 INT'L ORG. 425, 430-37 (1979) (discuss-
ing an economic model of issue linkages).
42. See id.; see also James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Is-
sues and Parties, 37 INT'L ORG. 281, 300 (1983) (noting "cases in which adding issues may be
mutually beneficial" to negotiating parties). Linkage represents an effective way of overcoming a
distributional conflict when direct transfer payments are not feasible.
43. Davis, supra note 11, at 163-65. Contrary to several studies contending that economic in-
terests, market power, or lobbying activities explain when trade liberalization occurs, Davis
shows that institutional cross-issue linkages are more relevant in determining trade patterns. Issue
linkage has forged an agreement when powerful lobby groups have opposed cooperation. Linkage
alters the interest group dynamics by mobilizing coalitions to counter parochial pressures. Thus,
"[I]iberalization depends on overcoming the collective action problems and institutional biases at
the domestic level that favor protection... . Using issue linkage to mobilize industry groups
helps ... to counter both problems." Id. at 157.
44. Id at 158.
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subsidize its farmers, but when a multi-issue WTO negotiation incorpo-
rates agriculture, the involvement of other domestic ministries with in-
terests that counterbalance one another dilutes the relative influence of
the Ministry of Agriculture. 4 5 Linkages are not always feasible, howev-
er, particularly in the presence of ex ante uncertainty relating to the dis-
tributional consequences of a prospective agreement. The ambiguity as
to which states would win and which would lose under the agreement
compromises negotiators' abilities to devise transfer payments. In addi-
tion, linkages can burden the negotiation agenda, unraveling compro-
mises on issues that could succeed in isolation.46
While linkages within the WTO facilitate agreements that would not
be feasible in their absence, states always retain an incentive to defect
on the package deals that they have negotiated.47 The WTO can reduce
this temptation by helping states solidify issue linkages and reduce their
incentives for defection. The WTO agreements are legally binding on
all member states. If a WTO member violates its obligations, the WTO
can authorize trade retaliation measures and hold states accountable
through the DSM. 48 The enforceability of WTO agreements challenges
the common view that international law is always "soft" and compliance
with it voluntary. Thus, the WTO serves two related purposes: It facili-
tates the formation of linkages at the treaty-making stage and helps to
sustain these linkages by raising the costs of defection at the compliance
stage.
The need for enforcement is more germane in some areas of interna-
tional cooperation than in others. When states choose between binding,
enforceable agreements and non-binding agreements with no enforce-
ment provisions, the key causal variable is the risk of opportunism.49
Binding international agreements with cautiously negotiated commit-
ments are less susceptible to self-serving interpretation by states.o Such
agreements also deter cheating by raising the cost of non-compliance. 1
45. See id. at 153 (noting generally the role issue linkages have played in the "hard case" of
agriculture trade negotiations); id. at 157, 165 (offering issue expansion as a way to dilute the in-
fluence of entrenched agricultural interests and looking at French agricultural interests in particu-
lar).
46. Sebenius, supra note 42, at 300.
47. As long as states are able to enhance their individual payoff by defecting from the linkage
equilibrium, the temptation to defect from agreed transfer payments exists.
48. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, Annex 2; Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern Interna-
tional Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 358-
59 (1989) (discussing use of the Prisoner's Dilemma in international relations theory).
49. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581,
593-94 (2005).
50. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT'L ORG. 421, 426-27 (2000).
51. The costs of reneging can manifest themselves both in the form of reputational costs or
actual sanctions. See id. at 427.
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Binding agreements are, consequently, particularly advantageous in
Prisoner's Dilemma situations where the potential for costly opportun-
ism is high and cheating is difficult to detect. 52 In contrast, when the in-
centives to defect from the agreed commitments are low, a binding
agreement with enforceable commitments is less valuable. This is the
case predominantly in coordination games where the parties generally
lack incentives to deviate from the agreement once they establish the
focal point of coordination. 53
Accordingly, if the cooperation problem that states face resembles a
Prisoner's Dilemma - which acknowledges an intrinsic incentive for
the players to cheat - states are more likely to negotiate a binding
agreement with enforcement provisions. In contrast, if the cooperation
problem resembles a coordination game - where agreements are large-
ly self-enforcing - enforcement provisions are redundant and, thus, of-
ten not included. Barbara Koremenos's recent empirical study on dis-
pute settlement provisions in international agreements supports this
argument. Koremenos found that approximately half of all international
agreements among states include dispute settlement provisions. 4 She
also found that states include dispute settlement provisions only when
they are likely to be necessary. 5 In other words, the inclusion of the
dispute settlement provision correlates positively with the likelihood of
non-compliance or "the strength of individual actors' incentives to
cheat."5 6 It follows that the likelihood that states will negotiate agree-
ments within the WTO should also positively correlate with the states'
incentives to behave opportunistically.
Finally, states' choice of venue for negotiating international agree-
ments reflects their perception of which institution allows them to ob-
tain the best possible outcome at the lowest possible cost.57 In addition
to the WTO's key advantages - linkages and an enforcement mecha-
nism - states' willingness to pursue an agreement in the WTO turns on
52. Id. at 429.
53. Raustiala, supra note 49, at 592-94; see also Abbott, supra note 48, at 358-59, 363-74.
While the possibility of defection is not entirely absent in coordination situations, any surrepti-
tious cheating, at least, is unlikely. See Lisa L. Martin, The Rational State Choice ofMultilateral-
ism, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FoRM
91, 102 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993).
54. Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution
Provisions, Which HalfNeeds Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (2007).
55. Id. at 209-10.
56. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of Interna-
tional Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 776 (2001).
57. On state forum shopping, see generally Davis, supra note 11, at 154-55; Daniel Drezner,
Who Rules? The Regulation of Globalization (Aug. 28, 2002) (unpublished paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association) (transcript available at
http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/whorules.pdf).
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the availability of alternatives outside the WTO. As the opportunity
costs of non-agreement in the WTO increase, so do the states' efforts to
include the issue in the WTO. In contrast, the more content states are
with the status quo or the more alternatives they have outside of the
WTO, the lower costs are to forgo WTO negotiations. Thus, the likeli-
hood of a WTO agreement is often not only a function of costs and ben-
efits of that agreement, but also a function of the opportunity costs of a
non-WTO agreement.s8
1I. TESTING THE LIMITS OF THE WTO: EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENT
OUTCOMES IN IP AND ANTITRUST COOPERATION
States' pursuit of international IP and antitrust cooperation under the
auspices of the WTO forms part of a broader goal to globally institu-
tionalize deregulation and trade liberalization and to further expand the
liberalization trend to the sphere of domestic regulation. Following sig-
nificant gains in reducing tariff barriers on goods and services, the focus
of trade talks has moved from the removal of conventional trade barriers
to identifying and addressing new trade barriers that states erect to pro-
tect their domestic markets. For instance, some observers project that
states will employ lax or strategic antitrust laws or offer inadequate pro-
tection of IP rights to hinder the free flow of goods and services into
their markets.59 Fear of these new forms of protectionism has reinforced
demands to expand the scope of the WTO to include rules regarding IP
rights and antitrust, among other areas, in order to preserve the econom-
ic benefits of free trade.60
In 1994, the TRIPS Agreement - adopted as a part of the Final Act
of the Uruguay Round - successfully brought IP rights under the aus-
58. See, e.g., David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 97, 97-114 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey
Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
59. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, in COMPETITION LAWS IN
CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 99, 101, 108-09 (Richard A.
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).
60. The growing trend to broaden the WTO's negotiation agenda can also be explained by the
WTO's successful historical track record in embracing a variety of more or less trade-related are-
as. The undeniable substantive links that trade policy has with other policy domains has further
contributed to the perception that the WTO is a natural forum in which to pursue regulatory re-
forms in any area of economy. In addition, the WTO has been a particularly attractive forum for
pursuing further trade liberalization due to the broad membership and the enforcement mecha-
nism that the institution offers. Various interest groups demanding greater global regulation there-
fore often consider WTO to be the most effective forum for them to advance their goals. The
WTO's perceived effectiveness has further reinforced path dependency and regime persistence.
See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, The WTO As Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 146-47 (2002);
Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT'L STUD. Q. 379, 389
(1988).
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pices of the WTO.6' The Agreement established a global IP regime with
provisions to protect and enforce patents, copyrights, trademarks, and
trade secrets.62 It provides for minimum standards that bind all WTO
members, coupled with a system of international enforcement.6 ' The
initiative for the Agreement came from a small group of powerful U.S.
corporations whose activities depend on strong IP protection.64 This
group mobilized the support of their counterparts in the EU and Japan.
These private interest groups subsequently lobbied their respective gov-
ernments and ensured that their IP agenda remained a negotiating priori-
ty for these three key entities.65
Initially, developing countries - including India, Brazil, and South
Korea - strongly resisted the developed countries' push for an agree-
ment.66 After eight years of trade talks, however, the TRIPS Agreement
emerged as a part of a "grand bargain" consisting of multiple trade
deals, all of which were incorporated in the Final Act of the newly es-
tablished WTO.67 The TRIPS Agreement was the result of collaboration
among some of the most powerful multinational corporations and states
in the global trading system. As the discussion below explains, these
states used a mix of persuasion, pressure, threats, linkages, and other
bargaining tactics to suppress the developing countries' resistance to the
Agreement.
For those who advocate expanding the scope of the WTO, TRIPS is
an important precedent showing that the WTO can accommodate new
issues that fall outside of the traditional non-discrimination regime and
encroach into the realm of domestic regulation.68 The TRIPS Agree-
ment imposes positive obligations on states to undertake regulatory re-
forms, going well beyond the scope of issues that the WTO traditionally
addresses. 69 TRIPS is also an oft-cited precedent for those who argue
61. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11(2).
62. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 9-14 (recognizing copyrights), 15-21 (recognizing trade-
marks), 27-34 (recognizing patents), 39 (recognizing trade secrets under "undisclosed infor-
mation").
63. Id. arts. 1(1), 3, 8 (describing the scope of obligations and the basic principle of national
treatment); id. arts. 63-64, 68-73 (describing the dispute settlement mechanism).
64. Ostry, supra note 10, at 55-57.
65. Id.
66. MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 51, 67 (2004) (relating instances where the United States clashed with South
Korea and Brazil over the proper level of intellectual property protection).
67. See William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests: Implementing
the Doha Round, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 951, 951-56 (2002) (giving an overview of the "grand
bargain" in international trade that emerged in the 1990s and the uneven sharing of benefits in the
years that followed).
68. See Chamovitz, supra note 6.
69. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 39-43 (2007), availa-
ble at http://tinyurl.com/2vzq6 (outlining the Uruguay Round's achievements in imposing new
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that the WTO is best suited to address issues with distributional conse-
quences that create winners and losers.70 For instance, while develop-
ing countries would have been unlikely to sign on to a standalone
agreement regarding IP rights, they conceded when the WTO frame-
work included TRIPS as a part of a broader package that ensured gains
to each WTO member.71
The success of the TRIPS Agreement has fostered a perception that
the negotiation of antitrust commitments in the WTO ought to be feasi-
ble as well. Andrew Guzman, for instance, claims that "a very similar
strategic relationship among countries existed in IP until an agreement
was reached during the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO talks. The IP
case study offers a valuable lesson about how competition [antitrust]
policy negotiations should proceed." 72 As the recent history of WTO
negotiations shows, however, the efforts to negotiate an antitrust agree-
ment under the auspices of the WTO have failed, and cooperation has
followed a very different path.
States have pursued antitrust cooperation since the adoption of the
Havana Charter in 1948.73 The EU, with the support of Canada and Ja-
pan, has been the primary proponent of the WTO antitrust agreement.
The United States, on the other hand, has consistently resisted attempts
to incorporate antitrust into the trade regime.74 In 1996, at the request of
the EU, the WTO Ministerial Conference established a Working Group
on Competition. 75 The task of the Working Group was to examine the
linkages between trade and antitrust issues and identify issues that the
WTO should potentially address in this regard.76 The Doha Round,
launched in 2001, initially included antitrust on its negotiating agenda.77
intellectual property obligations).
70. See Guzman, supra note 11, at 950-51.
71. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 69, at 18-19 (giving an overview of the ma-
jor conflicts in the Uruguay Round and describing some of the concessions made to forge consen-
sus); id. at 93-99 (describing special provisions designed to benefit developing countries).
72. Guzman, supra note 11, at 974.
73. See, e.g., Nataliya Yacheistova, The International Competition Regulation: A Short Re-
view of a Long Evolution, 18 WORLD COMPETITION 99, 99-110, (1994); see also MARSDEN, su-
pra note 4, at 45-66.
74. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, Address at the Fordhan Cor-
porate Law Institute 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22,
1998), available at http://tinyurl.com/2ebkpzu.
75. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996,
WT/MIN(96)/DEC [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial Declaration].
76. Id.
77. Antitrust, or "competition policy," was one of the so-called "Singapore issues," together
with investment, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement, that were placed
on a conditional negotiation track. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002); see also infra note 162. Being on a
conditional negotiation track made it subject to an explicit decision on the scope and timeframe of
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At the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting, however, resistance from de-
veloping countries stalled the negotiations. Following the collapse of the
negotiations in Cancun, the WTO General Council decided to officially
drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round negotiation agenda on Au-
gust 1, 2004. Little suggests that the WTO antitrust negotiations will
be revived soon.
This Part explains why the TRIPS Agreement was successful, why
antitrust negotiations were a failure, and why exactly the two outcomes
were so divergent. 79 It first discusses the general preconditions for suc-
cessful cooperation - Great Power consensus and the support of influ-
ential interest groups - and shows how these attributes were present in
the case of the TRIPS negotiations but were missing in the case of anti-
trust negotiations. While most recognize the presence of these condi-
tions in the case of TRIPS, the broad literature advocating a WTO anti-
trust agreement has been surprisingly ignorant of the absence of
coherent Great Power and interest group support, cultivating unfounded
optimism about the prospect of harnessing the necessary political
backing for any such agreement. The discussion below seeks to explain
why no coherent interest group coalition has emerged to support a WTO
antitrust agreement and - maybe even more surprisingly - why pow-
erful states have repeatedly put antitrust on the WTO's negotiation
agenda even when none of the influential interest groups has urged them
to do so.
The discussion then moves on to examine the WTO-specific precon-
ditions for successful cooperation in the two areas. It argues that the
gains and losses that would result from the TRIPS Agreement were rela-
tively unambiguous prior to the conclusion of the Agreement, enabling
states to design issue linkages that compensated developing countries
that expected to lose from the Agreement. In contrast, the substantial
uncertainty regarding prospective winners and losers has impeded anti-
negotiations at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference.
78. See World Trade Organization General Council, supra note 4.
79. This Article highlights five primary reasons that explain the success of the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the failure to reach an agreement on antitrust. There are, however, other explanations
for why the TRIPS Agreement was successful. For instance, the political and ideological climate
was particularly favorable to the TRIPS Agreement at the time the negotiations were launched.
Neo-classical economic liberalism dominated the thinking of the international community and the
major international institutions in 1980s. Ronald Reagan's United States and Margaret Thatcher's
United Kingdom embraced a free-market agenda that sought to institutionalize deregulation and
trade liberalization globally. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Secretariat
endorsed the liberal trade order and sought to regain its relevance in the eyes of the developed
countries, which had begun to bypass the GATT in their economic policymaking after the GATT
became preoccupied with the developing country concerns in early 1980s. This led the GATT
Secretariat to endorse the developed country agenda, including the TRIPS Agreement. See Sell,
supra note 17, at 315-20 (discussing the international climate ahead of negotiations on TRIPS).
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trust negotiations, obstructing states' ability to form issue linkages.
Thus, the existing literature has overestimated the WTO's ability to re-
sort to linkages, overlooking that the linkage strategy is contingent on
states' ability to predict the distributional consequences of the agree-
ment.
The discussion below also asserts that defection from a prospective
agreement was a concern underlying the TRIPS negotiations, whereas
the likelihood of cheating - and hence the need for WTO's enforce-
ment mechanism - is of lesser concem in antitrust negotiations. This
claim challenges the prevailing presumption that incentives to defect
from commitments would also impede antitrust cooperation. Finally, the
net gains to the proponents of the TRIPS Agreement were much higher
and more certain than the prospective gains for any state supporting a
WTO antitrust agreement. Similarly, the opportunity costs of not coop-
erating with respect to IP rights in the WTO were significantly higher
than they were in the case of antitrust, where various alternatives for
pursuing regulatory convergence existed.
A. The Power-Politics Explanation: Does the "Great Power
Consensus " Exist?
A consensus among the Great Powers regarding the necessity and the
content of the TRIPS Agreement was a defining factor that led to the
successful conclusion of the Agreement. In contrast, an accord among
the Great Powers was lacking on the antitrust issue, contributing to the
breakdown of those negotiations.
1. The Great Power Consensus on the TRIPS Agreement
The Great Powers are also the world's leading producers of IP prod-
ucts.80 As unambiguous beneficiaries of stronger IP protection, they
were ardent advocates of the TRIPS Agreement and pursued their goal
as a unified front.81 Stronger international IP protection would reinforce
80. The benefits of IP protection are highly concentrated in a few economically powerful de-
veloped countries. According to WIPO, in 2000, nationals of developed countries owned ninety-
three percent of all patents granted to foreigners. Five countries - the United States, Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland - owned seventy-six percent of them, the United
States' share being twenty-six percent. The United States is the primary beneficiary of IP-related
trade. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 51. The United States' net income from IP-related trade in-
creased from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $14.3 billion in 2001. Id. at 54. The pharmaceutical industry
is illustrative of how concentrated the benefits from the TRIPS Agreement were going to be:
Ninety percent of new pharmaceutical products originate in the ten leading countries, which also
host over two-thirds of the total world production of pharmaceuticals. The United States, EU, and
Japan account for over ninety percent of research and development expenditure in the field. Id. at
82.
81. See, e.g., A.O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPS Agreement: Origins and His-
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their position as IP exporters by enabling them to charge supra-
competitive prices for their products abroad. Thus, the TRIPS Agree-
ment guaranteed an improvement to the Great Powers' terms of trade
and national income.82
Since the Great Powers unanimously supported the TRIPS Agree-
ment, the only true battle was to persuade the developing countries to
sign on to the Agreement. As consumers and copiers of IP-related prod-
ucts, rather than producers, developing countries had little to gain from
the TRIPS Agreement.83 While developed countries argued that the
TRIPS Agreement would benefit developing countries by stimulating
innovation and attracting foreign direct investment, developing coun-
tries found such benefits to be weak, distant, and uncertain.8 4 In addi-
tion, given the extent of the domestic opposition to the Agreement, de-
veloping countries knew that signing on would be politically costly.
Hence, the TRIPS Agreement seemed to offer no Pareto-gains for de-
veloping countries.
If developing countries knew that the TRIPS Agreement would re-
duce their economic welfare, why did they sign on to it? In the WTO,
all states have equal voting rights, and the consensus principle guides
the decision-making process.85 These institutional safeguards ought to
ensure that the Great Powers cannot impose undesirable agreements on
developing countries. A closer examination of the dynamics of the
WTO negotiations, however, reveals that the formal equality of the
states often yields to power-based bargaining in practice.
Developing countries refrained from using their veto rights for two
primary reasons. First, developing countries already faced trade retalia-
tion from the Great Powers, which had previously resorted to coercive
tactics in their bilateral relations with less powerful trading partners.
Prior to TRIPS, the United States relied primarily on two instruments in
pressuring developing countries to adopt stronger domestic IP laws:
first, the denial or withdrawal of the GSP benefits, which enable certain
countries to enjoy preferential treatment such as lower tariffs in their
trade relations with the United States; and second, the employment of
tory of Negotiations 4, 12 (July 30, 2001) available at http://tinyurl.com/325a9vs (unpublished
manuscript, presented at the Eastern and Southern Africa Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade,
Intellectual Property, and Biological Resources, Nairobi, Kenya).
82. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 49. While some substantive disagreements among the Great
Powers existed, the magnitude of absolute gains available from the TRIPS Agreement superseded
any concerns the Great Powers harbored about relative gains under the final agreement.
83. See supra note 80; PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 51; see also Sell, supra note 17, at 318
(noting that, prior to TRIPS, many developing countries did not provide IP protection to foreign-
ers).
84. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 54-55.
85. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX(1).
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Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (19 U.S.C. § 2411), which enables
the United States to impose unilateral trade sanctions against countries
that engage in "unfair competition." 86 Thus, developing countries faced
the choice of either enduring continuing unilateral trade retaliation from
the United States - and to a lesser degree, from the EU - or accepting
a multilateral IP regime where the WTO's dispute settlement mecha-
nism would constrain the United States' ability to unilaterally retaliate
against them.87
Second, developing countries had no choice but to accept the TRIPS
Agreement because of a "single undertaking" approach that the Great
Powers successfully pursued to close the Uruguay Round. Unlike the
previous trade negotiation rounds, which had allowed states to opt out
of trade agreements by which they did not want to be bound, the single
undertaking approach meant that the acceptance of the entire set of the
Uruguay Round agreements - including the TRIPS Agreement - was
a precondition to receiving any benefits provided by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)89 as well as to membership in
the newly established WTO. 90 To compel all states to accept the Final
Act of the Uruguay Round and join the WTO, the United States and the
EU withdrew from their 1947 GATT responsibilities and terminated
their trade obligations vis-d-vis states that did not accept the Final Act.91
In doing so, the two trade powers removed the status quo and thereby
presented developing countries with a reduced set of choices. Develop-
ing countries had to decide whether to sign the TRIPS Agreement or
forgo all of the benefits that they had negotiated in the previous fifty
years. Obviously, they could not afford to choose the latter.92
86. On several occasions, the United States issued specific threats - at times carrying out
such threats - to coerce developing countries to agree to a higher level of IP protection. See
PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 67-68, 72 (noting the United States' successful attempts to coerce
South Korea and Brazil); see also United States Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
87. See PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 67-68, 72 (noting the United States' and the European
Community's successful efforts to force South Korea to extend greater IP protection in pharma-
ceutical area).
88. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 360.
89. GATT, a predecessor of the WTO, was executed in 1938. Today, the WTO provides a
treaty framework for various agreements, including GATT. See generally WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, supra note 69, at 12-13.
90. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 360 (describing the United States' and the European Commu-
nity's "single undertaking" approach, where they frame the trade negotiations as an all-or-nothing
package deal).
91. Id.
92. Id. The United States and European Community's exit strategy resembles Lloyd Gruber's
theory of "go-it-alone" power. Gruber contests the positive-sum models of international coopera-
tion and explains why states join institutions that are not Pareto-improving for them. He argues
that states that stand to lose from cooperative arrangements know that winners often can proceed
without them. Thus, the winners can "go-it-alone" and the new arrangement will materialize irre-
spective of the losing states' support, changing the institutional landscape in which the losing
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Although the principle of equal rights and consensus among all states
formally guides WTO negotiations, the history of the TRIPS Agreement
exposes the role that economic power plays in WTO negotiations. The
Great Powers' joint action in pursuit of a commonly defined goal paved
the way for the TRIPS Agreement and allowed them to overcome the
developing countries' initial resistance. The tactics that they used might
not have amounted to overt coercion, but, by changing the opportunity
set available to developing countries, these Great Powers effectively left
developing countries with little choice but to sign on to an agreement
that was not Pareto-improving to them. The Great Powers are still able
to dictate the negotiation agenda, the bargaining process, and the final
outcome, challenging the institutionalist paradigm that assumes that in-
ternational institutions are Pareto-improving and facilitate mutual gains
for all states.93
2. The Great Power Divide on International Antitrust Cooperation
One of the primary obstacles to a binding international antitrust
agreement has been a longstanding dispute between the United States
and the EU regarding the content and institutional form of such an in-
ternational antitrust collaboration, in stark contrast to the Great Power
consensus on IP issues. Even as U.S. and EU antitrust laws are gradual-
ly converging, disagreement on the optimal content of antitrust laws
remains. This disagreement is the result of different beliefs on when and
how a government should intervene when markets fail. In general, the
EU tends to be more interventionist and less tolerant of market power.94
Consequently, the EU is more likely to challenge mergers and pursue
the conduct of a dominant corporation. Commentators often cite the di-
vergent outcomes in the Microsoft monopoly case and the
states operate. This changes the losing states' interest calculation and causes them to join the new
institution even though they would have preferred that such an institution never materialized in
the first place. Thus, while the TRIPS Agreement did not offer any Pareto-gains for developing
countries, it was strategically better for developing countries to join the WTO which incorporated
the TRIPS Agreement than for them to give up all their hard-earned trade benefits. See generally
LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (2000).
93. See PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 228; Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization,
and Competition: The Different Pathways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 841
(2005). See generally GRUBER, supra note 92; Steinberg, supra note 16.
94. Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU- Con-
verging or Diverging Paths?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 15 (2004); see also Nuno Garoupa &
Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United
States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1579 (2008); Andreas Kirsch & William Weesner, Can Antitrust
Law Control E-Commerce? A Comparative Analysis in Light of U.S. and E. U Antitrust Law, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 297, 308 (2006).
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GE/Honeywell merger as the most prominent examples of the remain-
ing transatlantic differences.95
The EU initially proposed the WTO antitrust rules and has remained
the antitrust agreement's strongest advocate, 96 while the United States
has repeatedly stated its opposition to the WTO antitrust rules. The
United States has, instead, supported bilateral cooperation agreements
and voluntary multilateral cooperation within the International Competi-
tion Network (ICN) - a network of the world's antitrust agencies.98
The EU's support of formal WTO negotiations stems from a variety
of factors, including its preference for multilateral, institutionalized
rulemaking over less predictable, case-by-case cooperation among regu-
lators.99 The EU is also willing to link antitrust more closely to trade
policy, whereas the United States wants to keep the two issues sepa-
rate. 00 In addition, as more WTO members are moving toward adopting
EU-style - as opposed to U.S.-style - antitrust laws, the EU perceives
the antitrust cooperation within the WTO as an opportunity to institu-
tionalize its own preferred regulatory regime globally. 101
International cooperation is more likely to fail when the Great Pow-
ers are divided, so it is no surprise that the United States-EU divergence
has obstructed states' abilities to negotiate antitrust matters in the WTO.
The United States' opposition has not, however, been the only obstacle
95. On the Microsoft market dominance issue, compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231
F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), and New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C.
2002) (endorsing the settlement between the United States and Microsoft), with Commission De-
cision of 24 March 2004, COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23 [hereinafter Mi-
crosoft Commission Decision] (imposing a fine after concluding that Microsoft had abused its
dominant position in violation of Art. 82 EC). On the GE/Honeywell merger, compare Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between Gen-
eral Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at http://tinyurl.com/29by88h [hereinafter
Dep't of Justice Press Release] (approving the merger subject to limited divestitures), with Com-
mission Decision of 3 July 2001, COMP/M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell, 2004 O.J. (L 48) 1
[hereinafter General Electric/Honeywell Commission Decision] (declaring the merger "to be in-
compatible with the common market").
96. See Mario Monti, European Comm'r for Competition Policy, A Global Competition Poli-
cy?, Address at the European Competition Day Conference (Sept. 17, 2002), available at
http://tinyurl.com/36cbzqc. See generally Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy, Communication from the European Community and Its Member States,
WT/WGTCP/W/1 15 (May 25, 1999).
97. See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 74.
98. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Int'l Competition Advisory Comm. to the Att'y
Gen. and Assistant Att'y Gen. for Antitrust, Final Report 33 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC Report],
available at http://tinyurl.com/2fyn4nk; William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence and Coopera-
tion, Address at the American Bar Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), available at
http://tinyurl.com/25fr7vy.
99. Bradford, supra note 8, at 407.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 408.
24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
for antitrust negotiations. At the 2003 Cancun Ministerial meeting, a co-
alition of developing countries blocked the negotiations.' 02 While de-
veloping countries would arguably have been the greatest beneficiaries
of the international antitrust agreement, the regulatory burden and re-
sulting compliance costs turned developing countries against it. Without
adequate resources or legal and economic expertise to enforce antitrust
laws, many developing countries concluded that they were not ready to
negotiate the WTO antitrust agreement.' 0 3
The Cancun failure shows that developing countries can sometimes
successfully offset some of the Great Powers' bargaining advantage by
forming coalitions that veto specific proposals, thereby compromising
the leverage that the Great Powers have over outcomes.' 04 Resource
pooling helps weaker states gain more diplomatic clout, since their
combined market size translates directly into more bargaining power.'05
In particular, when the interests of the Great Powers diverge, developing
countries can more effectively counter the pressure that a fragmented
Great Power coalition exercises.
In the ongoing Doha Round, the United States and the EU have been
unable to dominate the negotiations. They have often found themselves
in opposing alliances.106 When the United States and the EU have not
acted in concert, developing countries have taken advantage of the
102. See, e.g., Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Sub-
stance?, 31 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 7 (2004); World Trade Organization, Day 5:
Conference Ends Without Consensus (Sept. 14, 2003), http://tinyurl.com/2wvppod.
103. Developing countries also expected to incur political costs from the agreement, since
import-competing industries or former state monopolies were likely to resist strict antitrust laws
removing their existing government protection. Additionally, developing countries failed to see
the agreement on antitrust as a development priority in light of more pressing socio-economic
problems that would need to be addressed. See Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure:
The Answer is New Negotiating Geometries, Not WTO Reform, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at 16.
104. The "G20," a coalition of developing countries (not to be confused with the G20 that re-
fers to the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors), was a major force
in blocking the antitrust negotiations in Cancun. Developing countries have also kept off the table
issues including labor rights, which the United States has demanded, and environmental issues,
which the European Union has endorsed. Furthermore, developing countries prevailed in demand-
ing a declaration on TRIPS and public health, despite strong objections from the United States.
See, e.g., John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Reframing the Issue: The WTO Coalition on Intellectual
Property and Public Health, 2001, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE
WTO AND NAFTA 85 (John S. Odell ed., 2006).
105. Manfred Elsig, Diferent Facets of Power in Decision-Making in the WTO 25-28
(NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper No. 2006/23), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1090146. Reliance on coalitions also mitigates the information gap and
deficient resources. However, the larger the coalitions are, the less cohesive and thereby less ef-
fective they become (for example, African states and other developing countries do not always
have shared interests on issues regarding South-South trade). The relative influence and ability to
extract commitments diminishes as compromises need to be negotiated within the coalition. Id. at
27.
106. Id. at 24.
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Great Power divide and obstructed the negotiations, despite the signifi-
cant opportunity costs that the failure of the Doha Round - antitrust
agreement included - presents to them. Ironically, it seems that the
power divide in antitrust has prevented states from signing an agreement
that is potentially welfare-enhancing for all states. Accordingly, power
politics interferes with the notion of Pareto-optimality by causing some
Pareto-improving agreements - including the WTO antitrust agree-
ment - to fail while allowing other agreements - including the TRIPS
Agreement - to materialize, despite these agreements' failure to deliv-
er gains to all WTO members.
B. The Political Economy Explanation: Do Strong Domestic
Interest Groups Support the International Agreement?
The TRIPS Agreement emerged following unprecedented pressure
from interest groups as influential multinational corporations promoted
the inclusion of the IP rights into the WTO agenda.107 In contrast, few
corporations, industry organizations, or consumer groups have actively
endorsed a WTO antitrust agreement. Instead, a small number of promi-
nent antitrust agencies have spurred the demand for international anti-
trust rules, while individual corporations have focused their lobbying
efforts on domestic antitrust agencies if the companies' interests have
been directly and individually at stake. 08
1. The Interest Groups' Quest for the TRIPS Agreement
As argued above,109 the TRIPS Agreement was going to improve the
terms of trade for the Great Powers that were, and continue to be, the
major exporters of IP products. In addition, within those countries, a
distinctly defined group of producers whose commercial success relies
on vigorous IP protection was going to capture those gains. These pro-
ducers became the primary advocates of the TRIPS Agreement. 0 They
formed a transnational coalition and engaged in an unprecedented lob-
bying effort to establish a global IP regime.'
107. See Ostry, supra note 10, at 55-57.
108. See, e.g., ICC/BIAC COMMENTS, supra note 10.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
110. The efforts to create a global IP regime were led by the Intellectual Property Committee
(IPC), an ad hoc interest group consisting of twelve chief executives representing pharmaceutical,
movie, and software industries. The IPC reached out to their counterparts in Europe and Japan to
mobilize a transnational coalition to press for the agreement (most notably, UNICE in the EU,
and Keidanren in Japan). For a discussion on the emergence of the IPC as a key norm entrepre-
neur behind the TRIPS Agreement, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 100-08 (2003).
111. Id.
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The support of powerful multinational corporations does not, as such,
guarantee that those private interests will translate into government pol-
icies and, ultimately, into public international law. While private inter-
ests prevailed in the TRIPS negotiations, the triumph of the multina-
tional corporations in devising the global trade order has not stretched
across all issue areas. For instance, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS)ll 2 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS),' 13 which many of the same interest groups support-
ed and which took place at the same time and within the same frame-
work as the TRIPS negotiations, fell short of the demands of the pri-
vate-sector activists. 114 Accordingly, it appears that the TRIPS Agree-
Agreement was a product of a distinct set of circumstances that made it
particularly susceptible to intense lobbying.
Interest groups assumed a prominent role in the TRIPS talks because
of the particularly high benefits that they expected to receive from their
lobbying efforts. The pharmaceutical industry, for one, is highly de-
pendent on effective patent protection. According to some estimates, the
average costs for developing a new drug are $500-$800 million.' 15 Only
three out of ten marketable drugs produce profits that exceed the aver-
age costs of their research and development.116 Approximately sixty
percent of drugs produced by the pharmaceutical industry may have
never been developed in the absence IP protection, according to some
estimates.1 17 Thus, the high stakes involved in securing enhanced IP
protection increased the expected utility of the industry's lobbying ac-
tivities.
Second, the lobbying was particularly attractive to corporations be-
cause they knew that its benefits would fall on a small and coherent in-
terest group." 8 Lobby groups are most effective when they have homo-
112. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
113. General Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186.
114. SELL, supra note 110 at 4. The private interests supporting the GATS Agreement, for in-
stance, consisted of a more diverse group of corporate actors including representatives of the
banking industry, legal services, and the travel industry. Thus, overcoming collective action prob-
lems was more challenging in the presence of a more heterogeneous interest group. See id. at 172.
115. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 89.
116. Id.
117. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SC. 173,
175 (1986).
118. The small membership of the lobbying coalition also ensured that the per-person stakes
were higher. Small membership in a lobbying group increases the probability that any single
member of the coalition can affect the outcome. Lobbying was also successful because of the
technological know-how advantage the coalition possessed over the government negotiators re-
garding the IP agenda. Pharmaceutical multinational corporations and other IP-driven corpora-
tions exploited this informational advantage by lending their expertise to the governments. The
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geneous interests. 119 Corporations supporting the TRIPS Agreement
came from highly concentrated business sectors, allowing them to con-
struct a unified cross-industry position. 120 The lobby's limited number
of members and clear sectoral definition diminished the danger of con-
flicting interests, allowing the coalition to pursue a cohesive mission
through unified strategies. 12 1 In other words, the need to secure global
IP protection provided a powerful common interest for the industry and
a solid basis for cooperation. The joint gains available to the industry
from the TRIPS Agreement superseded any relative gains that the cor-
porations were hoping to secure as each other's competitors.122
Finally, the costs of collective action, which can at times undermine
interest groups' ability to pursue their interests, never became a major
obstacle for the TRIPS lobby. The TRIPS lobby consisted of a particu-
larly resourceful group of corporations that were able to sustain high
lobbying costs through high marginal profits within their respective in-
dustries.123 Also, the prospect of free riding, which is one of the primary
costs of collective action for interest groups, was diminished because
the interest group was small, coherent, and restricted to a few indus-
tries. 124 Such a homogeneous group with limited membership is better
able to mitigate the collective action problems inherent to lobbying,
which both reduces the costs and increases the benefits of lobbying.
The extent of political rents available from the TRIPS Agreement
provided the governments of the most powerful trading nations a strong
framing skills of the lobbying coalition also increased their prospects of successfully influencing
the governments' negotiations positions. The IPC, for instance, framed the issue to the U.S. gov-
ernment as a "trade problem" as much as an "IP problem." The U.S. government was particularly
responsive to the IPC's IP agenda when it was presented as crucial for the United States' com-
petitiveness and a solution to the United States' increasing trade deficit. SELL, supra note 110, at
2, 105.
119. The members of the TRIPS coalition also had much to gain from pooling their resources
when engaging in their costly lobbying activities and incurring the costs of organizing a coalition,
collecting and disseminating information, preparing policy briefs, and presenting them to the
government negotiators. See GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST
POLITICS 143 (2001).
120. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 93, 115. The pharmaceutical industry, for instance, consists
of thirty to fifty multinational corporations producing approximately two-thirds of world pharma-
ceutical output. Id. at 93.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 5-6.
123. See Top Industries: Most Profitable, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 4, 2009,
http://tinyurl.com/2542mhm (listing the pharmaceutical industry as the third most profitable in-
dustry among Fortune 500 companies on both a return on revenues and a return on assets basis).
124. Note, however, that some risk of free-riding persists, as a corporation may always elect
not to participate in lobbying efforts, knowing that it would the reap benefits of any agreement the
lobbying coalition could secure. IP protection, in particular, would be akin to a non-excludable
and non-rival public good whereby one member cannot reasonably prevent another from consum-
ing the good and where one member's consumption of the good does not affect that of another.
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political economy rationale to support the Agreement. The counter-
lobby opposing the TRIPS Agreement consisted of a much less orga-
nized and considerably less resourceful set of corporations that copy or
consume IP-related products, including manufacturers of generic phar-
maceuticals. In the end, the transnational coalition that lobbied for the
TRIPS Agreement was successful beyond its initial goals. The compre-
hensiveness of the TRIPS Agreement superseded even the initial expec-
tations of the multinational corporations supporting the Agreement,125
setting the TRIPS lobby apart from most other instances where private
corporations have been actively lobbying for international regimes.
Consequently, one can explain the emergence of the TRIPS Agree-
ment as a manifestation of some of the world's most powerful corpora-
tions acting in concert with the world's most powerful economies.126
The views presented by the Great Powers in the WTO closely mirrored
the views that their domestic industries advanced.127 The governments
became agents of the domestic IP lobby, which not only devised the
global IP agenda and developed a strategy to realize it, but also steered
governments through the negotiation process toward an outcome that
closely aligned with the interests of the IP industry.
2. The Agency-Driven Pursuit ofInternational Antitrust Rules
In contrast to the TRIPS negotiations, private interests have been
largely absent from the quest for WTO antitrust rules. Few corporations,
industry organizations, or consumer groups have endorsed the agree-
ment.128 The international antitrust regime does not seem to have a clear
constituency that would unequivocally benefit from the WTO antitrust
rules, and so there is no equivalent stakeholder to assume the role the IP
industry played in the TRIPS negotiations. In the absence of strong do-
mestic interest group support, governments have not invested their polit-
ical capital in negotiating an agreement that would confer limited, if
any, political rents to them.
125. SELL, supra note 110, at 40 ("The IPC itself was surprised by how much it achieved; the
TRIPS accord far surpassed the IPC's initial expectations.").
126. Id. at 3.
127. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 172-73. The EU Commission, for instance, explicitly
acknowledged that its pursuit of a global IP regime stems from the interests of the European IP
industry. See id. at 173 (noting that the commission has argued that its "prolific activity is due to
the need, clearly felt nowadays, to provide European firms doing business in non-Community
countries with an adequate legal framework within which to enjoy effective, genuine protection
of know-how and innovation").
128. See, e.g., ICC/BIAC COMMENTS, supra note 10. While the ICC and BIAC support some
degree of substantive and procedural harmonization and convergence of domestic merger re-
gimes, "ICC and BIAC agree the WTO is not an appropriate forum for the review of private re-
straints and that the WTO should not develop new competition laws under its framework at this
time." Id at 10.
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As a constituency, consumers seem to be the only group that
would benefit from antitrust action in most, if not all, cases. This is
because lawmakers in most jurisdictions enact antitrust laws to max-
imize consumer welfare.129 Consumers, however, form a fragmented
interest group. Consumer organizations representing the interests of in-
dividual consumers have also assumed a passive role in the debate on
international antitrust rules, instead focusing their lobbying activities on
less "technocratic" areas of cooperation.130
What explains the relative passiveness of corporations in the antitrust
domain? The stakes in international antitrust cases appear high. The
costs involved in the EU Commission's prohibition of the proposed
GE/Honeywell merger - a merger between two U.S. corporations -
were extremely high, as were the litigation costs and remedies Mi-
crosoft faced in Europe. 3' Microsoft, GE, and Honeywell were forced
to bear these costs despite receiving clearance of the transactions and
conduct in question from U.S. antitrust agencies.' 32 Thus, one could ex-
pect an international agreement mitigating the costs associated with in-
consistent domestic antitrust laws to confer high benefits on at least
some powerful corporations that seek growth through mergers or fre-
quently face multi-jurisdictional antitrust investigations. Yet no coher-
ent coalition has emerged to support a WTO antitrust agreement. Simi-
larly, one may wonder why developing country corporations would not
lobby for international antitrust rules that would more effectively disci-
pline multinational corporations that operate in their domestic markets.
The diffuse, case-specific, and often unpredictable nature of the costs
and benefits that a WTO antitrust agreement would bring explains the
129. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1651(b) (3d ed. 2008) (making
the economic case for the consumer welfare standard generally); Albert H. Kritzer et al., 2
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT MANUAL § 44A (2010) ("The fundamental aim of competition rules
is to prevent companies with market power from harming consumer welfare. . . ."); K.J. Cseres,
The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard, 3 COMPETITION L. REv. 121 ("[T]he con-
sumer welfare standard is ... today, a commonly proclaimed goal of competition policy and an
often applied benchmark of competition law enforcement.").
130. See Raustiala, supra note 49, at 600. Raustiala argues that interest groups that favor in-
ternational cooperation in a given issue generally support binding agreements because of their
perceived effectiveness. Binding agreements also offer the domestic constituency more opportu-
nities to influence the agreements' content as their conclusions generally require more domestic
legislative involvement. In contrast, informal cooperation mechanisms emerge in the areas of
"technocratic cooperation," including antitrust, where domestic interest groups are less active.
131. General Electric/Honeywell Commission Decision, supra note 95; Commission Decision
of 28 June 2000, COMP/M.1741 - MCI WorldCom/Sprint, 2003 O.J. (L 300) 1; see also Mi-
crosoft Commission Decision, supra note 95.
132. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (endorsing the settlement be-
tween the United States and Microsoft); New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76; Dep't
of Justice Press Release, supra note 95 (generally allowing the GE/Honeywell merger).
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inactivity of interest groups in the antitrust domain. For instance, vigor-
ous antitrust enforcement is likely to be in the interest of a corporation,
as long as the authorities across multiple jurisdictions are targeting its
competitors. But, when any given corporation becomes the target of an
antitrust investigation, its position toward international antitrust cooper-
ation is likely to reverse.' 33 This leads most corporations to be of two
minds about increased international antitrust regulation, depending on
which side of the dispute they stand on in each individual case.' 34 Thus,
the benefit that any all-encompassing WTO antitrust agreement would
confer is uncertain for a corporation that is contemplating political ac-
tion. More specifically, the benefit would seem to vary from case to
case, sometimes conferring no benefit at all. When a corporation cannot
determine ex ante whether and how much it would benefit from an
agreement, it is less likely to engage in lobbying activity.
From the point of view of interest groups, the key difference between
the TRIPS and the antitrust negotiations is that, in the case of antitrust,
the costs and the benefits of cross-border antitrust disputes fall on a sin-
gle firm, not on a single industry. Lobbying for or against antitrust regu-
lation, thus, becomes a private good, rather than a policy that an entire
industry pursues.135 This leads to the absence of industry-wide coali-
tions and moves the lobbying activity to the sphere of domestic agen-
cies' investigations in individual cases.
Accordingly, corporations are likely to choose the issues and instanc-
es in which they want antitrust agencies to cooperate on a case-by-case
basis. They employ their political strength vis-i-vis antitrust authorities
133. In general, while corporations tend to define their interests case-by-case, they are ex-
pected to be more supportive of cooperation in the case of merger reviews, as this would reduce
transaction costs and uncertainty. In contrast, corporations are expected to often resist rules that
facilitate cooperation in cartel cases in the fear of one day being the target of a cartel investiga-
tion. See ABA & INT'L BAR ASS'N, A TAX ON MERGERS?: SURVEYING THE TIME AND COSTS TO
BUSINESS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER REVIEWS 5 (June 2003), available at
http://tinyurl.com/37snwk7 [hereinafter MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER SURVEY] (noting that
fifty-six percent of the businesses surveyed see scope for improving and harmonizing merger no-
tification processes); see also ICC/BIAC COMMENTS, supra note 10.
134. Of course, a corporation that holds a dominant market position or even monopoly power
can be assumed to usually know ex ante on which side of the dispute it stands in an antitrust in-
vestigation. While Microsoft was, for instance, recently lobbying the EU Commission to block
Google's acquisition of DoubleClick and was, hence, advocating more stringent antitrust scrutiny,
in most cases, Microsoft knows that it would benefit from lenient antitrust laws. See Steve Lohr,
Microsoft Urges Review of Google-DoubleClick Deal, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2007, at A14. It
could potentially find a common standing with other powerful corporations holding monopoly
positions that would enable them to form a coalition that would lobby for an overall lenient global
antitrust regime. This has not happened, however, and the antitrust lobbying has remained cen-
tered in domestic agencies.
135. Michael J. Gilligan, Lobbying as a Private Good in Intra-Industry Trade, 41 INT'L
STUD. Q. 455, 456 (1997).
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when their interests are directly at stake.' 36 This type of political action
is rational, given the higher expected utility available from lobbying in
an individual case. When lobbying is a private good, there are no - or,
at most, few - other firms engaged in political activity.'37 While all the
costs of political action fall on a single firm, there is less free riding that
would add to the costs of collective action.138 In addition, the benefits of
lobbying are likely to be higher. A corporation is better able to deter-
mine the extent of its benefits on a case-by-case basis and adjust the
level of its optimal lobbying activity accordingly in each case. The ex-
pected benefit from lobbying would be higher, given that the likelihood
of a single firm determining an outcome is greater in the absence of
multiple, competing interests within a coalition. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, a single firm can accumulate all of the benefits when
an agency decides in its favor.
In the absence of interest groups supporting the WTO antitrust
agreement, it remains unclear why there have been attempts to negotiate
international antitrust rules. It is puzzling that powerful countries place
certain regulatory issues continuously on the WTO negotiation agenda,
even when the key domestic constituencies do not demand the agree-
ment and when the prospects of reaching such an agreement are slim.
Interestingly, while the primary supporters of the TRIPS Agreement
were multinational corporations, the driving forces behind the antitrust
negotiations have been a few domestic antitrust agencies that have had
the support of the broader trade community. Most prominently, the de-
mand for WTO antitrust rules stems from the EU Commission and its
antitrust enforcers.139 The trade officials at the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive and the EU's Directorate General for Trade have equally supported
136. For instance, considerable lobbying against undesired mergers takes place in the Euro-
pean Union, as corporations believe that the more aggressive enforcement practices of the Euro-
pean Union are likely to lead to stricter antitrust scrutiny and greater receptiveness to their argu-
ments.
137. Consider, however, instances when it is beneficial to form a lobbying coalition aimed at
influencing an agency directly in an individual case. For instance, a group of IT corporations col-
lectively lobbied the U.S. and EU antitrust agencies to bring a case against Microsoft. Gregg
Keizer, IBM, Adobe, Oracle Join EU Antitrust Case Against Microsoft, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr.
15, 2009, http://tinyurl.com/3ygvfd9 (discussing the ECIS interest group, formed to encourage an
EU antitrust investigation of Microsoft).
138. Free riding is not an option for a corporation whose interests are directly and individual-
ly at stake at a given investigation, as no other corporation has the interest of lobbying on its be-
half. Note, however, that antitrust agencies can at times free ride on one another's investigations.
Developing countries, for instance, benefit if the United States or the EU blocks a merger that
also impedes competition on the developing countries' markets.
139. See, e.g., Monti, supra note 96; Karel Van Miert, Vice Chairman of Competition Policy,
European Commission, International Cooperation in the Field of Competition: A View from the
EC, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 24th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law
and Policy (Oct. 16, 1997), available at http://tinyurl.com/296bnv6.
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the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO.140 Incorporating antitrust
would enhance trade officials' powers because antitrust would become a
"trade matter," giving trade officials the opportunity to ensure that anti-
trust laws do not offset the liberalization commitments that they have
negotiated in the trade domain. Thus, the pursuit for antitrust coopera-
tion has been agency-driven, as opposed to interest-group-driven.
That agencies pursue regulatory cooperation contrary to the prefer-
ences of domestic interest groups departs from the standard political
economy models, which assume that states are neutral aggregators of
interest group preferences. 14 1 Instead, the agency-driven antitrust coop-
eration suggests that states can be autonomous actors that develop pref-
erences on their own and pursue policy goals that do not necessarily re-
flect the demands of interest groups.142
C. Linkage Explanation: Are Linkages Feasible and Will They
Create or Destroy a Zone of an Agreement?
1. Linkages Paving the Way for the TRIPS Agreement
In the TRIPS negotiations, it was evident that the developed coun-
tries, where the majority of the research and development takes place,
were going to be the beneficiaries of the agreement and that the devel-
oping countries, mainly consumers or copiers of IP-protected products,
were going to lose under the agreement. 143 Thus, the main challenge in
the TRIPS negotiations was to overcome the distributional conflict and
win the support of the developing countries that had little to gain and
much to lose under the TRIPS Agreement.
The linkage of the TRIPS negotiations to concessions in other areas
eventually brought developing countries into the Agreement." As a
transfer payment, developed countries agreed to cut down subsidies to
their own farmers and lower their tariffs on agricultural products and
140. Spencer Weber Waller, National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of Cooper-
ation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1111,
1122-24 (1996) (noting that while the DOJ opposes the WTO agreement on antitrust, the USTR
supports it).
141. See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 35.
142. See generally Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies ofAnalysis in Cur-
rent Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3-38 (Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer &
Theda Skocpol eds., 1985).
143. See Adede, supra note 81, at 4-5.
144. Guzman, supra note 11, at 950-51; see also Davis, supra note 11, at 156, 165. Within
the IP domain, a few additional concessions were also given to the developing countries, includ-
ing promises of technology transfer and transition periods that allow them to delay implementa-
tion of the TRIPS Agreement.
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textiles that the developing countries imported.14 5 This strategic linkage
of two unrelated issues converted the "win-lose" bargaining game into a
"win-win" game where developed and developing countries exchanged
balanced concessions in the spirit of reciprocity.146 The successful con-
clusion of the TRIPS Agreement manifested the advantage of multi-
issue negotiations and the strategic use of linkages. The agreement
would not have been feasible in an institution such as the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO),147 which would have restricted
the negotiations exclusively to the IP domain. The linkage ensured that
the final negotiation package offered some Pareto-gains for all states.
This situation resembles a classic Prisoner's Dilemma situation. De-
veloping countries faced a choice of either offering or refusing IP pro-
tection. Developed countries faced a choice of either retaining the cur-
rent level of their existing agricultural subsidies or reducing them.
Developed countries could individually obtain the highest payoff by re-
taining their agricultural subsidies, if developing countries unilaterally
agreed to a higher level of IP protection. In contrast, the developing
countries would individually obtain the highest payoff by refusing to
enact IP regulation while having developed countries unilaterally cut
their subsidies. Both parties' best individual strategies, however, leave
the other party with the lowest possible payoff.
In this setting, both sets of countries prefer a mutual linkage - where
the developed countries cut subsidies and developing countries provide
IP protection - to a situation where developed countries maintain their
subsidies and developing countries fail to provide IP protection. The
mutual linkage also leads to the maximization of social welfare, as the
combined payoff of the parties is higher than the payoff resulting from
any other strategy. Both parties, however, retain an offensive and defen-
sive incentive to defect from the linkage equilibrium in an effort to ex-
ploit the other party and increase their individual payoffs. Thus, the fear
of the other party's defection pulls both parties toward non-cooperative
strategies. 148 Absent an agreement, the parties end up in a Pareto-
deficient equilibrium where the developed countries retain their agricul-
tural subsidies and developing countries fail to offer IP protection.
Since both parties prefer an alternative equilibrium, either player can
promise to eschew its dominant strategy if the other player reciprocates.
145. Guzman, supra note 11, at 950-51; see also Davis, supra note 11, at 156, 165.
146. Developing countries gained an important advantage in this linkage: developed countries
offered transfer payments. Moreover, developed countries could not unilaterally retaliate as long
as they subjected themselves to the WTO's DSM. See Part II.D. 1, infra.
147. WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization, WIPO Treaties - General Information, http://tinyurl.com/23gnym7 (last visited Aug. 20,
2010).
148. Abbott, supra note 48, at 362.
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Thus, developed countries can promise to cut down their agricultural
subsidies if developing countries agree to offer IP protection. This mu-
tually beneficial linkage allows both players to move from a Pareto-
deficient equilibrium to one that offers both parties their second-best
outcome. The new equilibrium is difficult to sustain, however, because
both parties retain an incentive to defect from the agreement. Therefore,
parties are likely to seek binding commitments and institutionalized
rules to enforce the linkage in the event of a unilateral defection.149 This
need for credible, enforceable linkage commitments explains the rela-
tive attractiveness of the WTO in this particular strategic situation.
While a strategic linkage in an institutionalized setting such as the
WTO can be a powerful tool to solve a distributional conflict, the link-
age strategy is not always feasible. The presence of ex ante transparency
regarding the distributional consequences of the agreement forms an
important precondition for the successful use of strategic linkages. To
exchange reciprocal concessions and form issue linkages, states must
know which state ought to compensate the other and by how much.
Thus, states must be able to identify the winners and losers of an agree-
ment prior to its conclusion and have some sense of the magnitude of
the gains and losses that they expect the agreement to generate.
The distributional consequences of the TRIPS Agreement were suffi-
ciently clear and quantifiable ex ante. For instance, the U.S. Internation-
al Trade Commission estimated that the losses of 193 U.S.-based firms
from piracy amounted to $23.8 billion in 1986, the year the Uruguay
Round was launched.150 The European Commission estimates that as
many as 100,000 EU job losses and as much as seven percent of world
trade are attributable to counterfeiting.15 ' Although some contested the-
se estimates, and the TRIPS Agreement's exact effect on these trends
was debatable, a high degree of certainty remained regarding the magni-
tude of the benefits and losses that the TRIPS Agreement would bring
about. Even more certain was the direction to which any compensation
ought to flow. Information regarding the identities and the nationalities
of all patent holders is transparent. Nobody disputed that the majority of
the TRIPS beneficiaries resided in the developed countries while the
majority of the TRIPS losers resided in the developing countries.152 De-
veloped countries were the unambiguous winners of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, and thus expected to offer transfer payments to balance the con-
cessions extracted from developing countries. Thus, the predictability of
149. Arthur A. Stein, The Politics ofLinkage, 33 WORLD POL. 77-79 (1980).
150. PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 58.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 54 (noting that the United States, United Kingdom, and France are the major
exporters of IP-related products).
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the Agreement's distributional consequences paved the way for the
linkages and, in turn, for the conclusion of the Agreement as a whole.
2. Distributional Uncertainty and the Infeasibility ofLinkages to
Facilitate the Antitrust Agreement
Not unlike the TRIPS negotiations, distributional tensions between
the United States and the EU on one hand and the developed and the
developing countries on the other have marked antitrust cooperation.
Unsurprisingly, proponents of the antitrust agreement have offered link-
ages in the WTO as a solution to the existing distributional conflict.'5 3
However, it is particularly difficult to devise linkages in the antitrust
context.154 Unlike in the case of TRIPS, where IP producers comprised
a clear group of winners and IP consumers comprised an equally unam-
biguous group of losers, the gains and losses available to the corpora-
tions that international antitrust regulation would target are ambiguous.
An international antitrust agreement's costs and benefits are likely to be
diffuse, issue- and case-specific, and, in most cases, unpredictable.
This type of distributional uncertainty obstructs states' ability to ex-
change reciprocal concessions and form issue linkages.
When corporations cannot predict which general policy will ultimate-
ly be the most favorable, they are less likely to support any all-
embracing policy proposal. 156 For the same reason that uncertainty relat-
ing to the distributional consequences has inhibited the formation of a
cohesive coalition to support the antitrust agreement, the uncertainty re-
lating to the winners and losers of the agreement has prevented the for-
mation of issue linkages. If states do not know in advance who will ul-
timately win and lose from the agreement, it is impossible for them to
assess the extent and direction of any transfer payments that would ad-
dress the distributional effects.
In addition to showing how underlying distributional uncertainty can
temper the usefulness of linkages, the failed antitrust negotiations high-
153. See PUGATCH, supra note 66, at 70.
154. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 426-29. Domestic corporations have difficulties determin-
ing ex ante whether they would benefit from a multilateral antitrust agreement. Any given corpo-
ration's support for enhanced cooperation in merger or cartel enforcement, for instance, is likely
to depend on whether they or their competitors are merging or, alternatively, are alleged to be
participating in collusive behavior. As firms cannot easily predict which general policy will favor
them more in the long run, ex ante lobbying for any given all-encompassing policy proposal is
difficult. States are therefore not receiving any consistent domestic signals that could be translat-
ed into a coherent state policy on the issue. Id.
155. For instance, while a state can accurately calculate the distributional consequences of a
tariff reduction (which is a quantifiable, sector-specific measure) or a removal of an export subsi-
dy (both of which are quantifiable and firm- or sector-specific), it is more complicated to try to
predict winners and losers under any prospective international antitrust agreement.
156. Bradford, supra note 8, at 428.
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light another challenge of the linkage strategy. Multi-issue negotiations
are always more costly and cumbersome than single-issue negotiations.
Devising linkages in the presence of such complexity is no small task.157
States need more information to assess the costs and benefits of various
agreements. Adding new issues to the negotiation increases the bureau-
cracy involved as members bring new government agencies to the bar-
gaining table.'58 Linkages are always counter-productive if their benefits
do not exceed the costs of bringing additional issues into the bargaining
process.1
Conventional political economy models often assume that negotia-
tions do not have transaction costs. These models expect efficient
agreements to materialize, so long as transfer payments can - at least
theoretically - compensate losing parties. Linkages should therefore
only facilitate negotiations. Yet when one introduces the transaction
costs that are inherent to issue linkages, the contracting costs of negoti-
ating multi-issue deals rise, and the prospects of reaching an agreement
diminish.
In a worst-case scenario, linkages can add layers of complexity to
deal making, converting a simple bargain into an intractable negotia-
tion.160 While linkages can foster agreements that would otherwise fail
due to distributional divisions, they can also have the opposite effect of
collapsing the entire negotiation, particularly when members bring non-
negotiable issues to the negotiation table.' 6 1 For example, new issues
can mobilize novel domestic interest groups with their own demands,
further complicating negotiations. An initial decision between States A
and B to link issues x and y to overcome their distributional conflict can
create the need for additional transfer payments if y also affects interest
groups in State C, which demand the linking of issue z as a condition for
accepting the agreement on issues x and y. The increase in the number
of issues adds to the complexity of the required transfer payments, inev-
itably rendering the negotiations more difficult to manage.
157. See Sebenius, supra note 42, at 305.
158. T. Clifton Morgan, Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining, 34 AM. J. POL.
Sc. 311, 320 (1990).
159. Id. at 320-21.
160. Sebenius, supra note 42, at 306. The failure of antitrust negotiations when linked with
other Singapore issues, see infra note 162, is indeed a classic example of this.
161. Davis, supra note 11, at 156. The other challenge is the difficulty of convincing all states
that an agreement on issue A is conditional to reaching an agreement on issue B. If the single un-
dertaking approach is relaxed in one negotiation, it is difficult to credibly convince the states that
conditionality holds in subsequent rounds. See generally James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms
of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387 (1994) (dis-
cussing the role of distributional and informational imbalances in developing a framework for an
agreement).
[Vol. 5 1:1
WHEN THE WTO WORKS, AND How IT FAILS
Linking antitrust negotiations to other "Singapore issues"' 62
including trade facilitation, investment protection, and transparency in
government procurement - contributed to the failure to launch antitrust
negotiations.163 Developing countries rejected not only antitrust, but al-
so the investment and procurement issues. Nevertheless, developed
countries, particularly the EU member states, refused to unpack the sin-
gle undertaking and separate the Singapore issues from one another,
overestimating their ability to coerce developing countries into accept-
ing the entire agreement.6 While antitrust negotiations had little
chance of salvation at this point, the EU's insistence on the package
deal ensured the ultimate collapse of the negotiations.
3. Concluding Remarks on the Effects of a Linkage Strategy
Deep distributional conflicts marked both antitrust and TRIPS nego-
tiations. While WTO members successfully employed linkages to re-
solve the distributional conflict in the case of TRIPS, they were unsuc-
cessful in the case of antitrust. Linkages can be a powerful tool to
overcome a distributional conflict and forge an agreement when a con-
sensus within a single-issue area is not feasible. Many linked issues can
promote cooperation, since there are more opportunities for mutual
gains. Thus, the more palpable the distributional consequences underly-
ing the issue, the more likely the states are to pursue its solution in the
WTO through an issue linkage. In contrast, states are more likely to re-
solve less controversial issues that do not present distributional conflicts
as single issues in a bilateral context.!65
Linkages are not, however, always available to help states fashion an
agreement. When considerable uncertainty marks the negotiations,
forming linkages is difficult, if not impossible. Preconditions for effec-
tive linkage bargains include predictability relating to the identity of
winners and losers, as well as some understanding of the magnitude of
positive or negative consequences that negotiating states expect an
agreement to generate. Thus, the WTO can only create an agreement
with the help of the linkage strategy when there is little uncertainty re-
garding the gains and losses that the agreement would generate. In addi-
tion to the problem of distributional uncertainty, the sheer complexity
162. "Singapore issues" refer to the four issues raised during the 1996 Singapore Ministerial
Conference: trade and investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement,
and trade facilitation (that is, simplifying trade procedures). Singapore Ministerial Declaration,
supra note 75; see also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 69, at 72 (listing the four top-
ics known as the "Singapore issues").
163. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 102, at 7-9.
164. Id.
165. See Davis, supra note 11, at 155-56.
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that issue linkages can introduce may offset their potential benefits.
Multi-issue negotiations can obstruct progress on issues that could have
been resolved easily in isolation. At worst, too broad of a negotiation
agenda can bring down an entire round, transforming the prospect of a
grand bargain into a grand failure.166
D. Enforcement Explanation: How Likely Is Opportunistic
Behavior?
The likelihood of opportunistic behavior is another key variable that
distinguishes international IP cooperation from international antitrust
cooperation. When negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism was crucial in ensuring that no state would defect
from its commitments.' 67 In contrast, I have elsewhere argued that the
likelihood of eluding international antitrust rules would be low.'68 Con-
sequently, the WTO's enforcement powers were more germane in the
context of international IP protection than in the case of international
antitrust cooperation, further explaining why the TRIPS Agreement ma-
terialized in the WTO but the negotiations on WTO antitrust agreement
stalled early in the process.
1. The Incentives to Defect from the TRIPS Agreement
Because of its DSM, the WTO constitutes the most attractive venue
for cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma situations when states are con-
cerned about the prospect of cheating once they have concluded the
agreement. In a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, each state has the incen-
tive to defect from the agreement since it can increase its individual
payoff by taking advantage of the other party's cooperation while refus-
ing to cooperate itself.
It is possible to model many international trade issues as Prisoner's
Dilemmas.169 Consider, for example, the regulation of tariffs that states
can employ at their borders. While all states would be better off under
free trade, a state can shift the terms of trade in its favor by raising its
tariffs while still benefiting from the low tariffs of its trading partner. In
the absence of an international agreement proscribing such conduct -
and an enforcement mechanism to guarantee states' adherence to the
agreement - states' incentives to maximize individual payoffs at the
expense of jointly optimal policies would lead to an equilibrium where
166. See generally Sebenius, supra note 42, at 300-03.
167. Ostry, supra note 8, at 2.
168. See generally Piilola, supra note 5.
169. See, e.g., JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 263 (1994).
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all states would raise their tariffs. This outcome would render every
state worse off.
The fear of defection was an important aspect of the strategic situa-
tion characterizing the TRIPS negotiations, leading developed countries
to pursue legally binding, enforceable commitments within the WTO.
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, WIPO provided a forum for negotiating
international IP rules. WIPO failed, however, to provide adequately
strong substantive rules or a mechanism for their enforcement,o which
was the primary reason developed countries sought to move much of in-
ternational IP rulemaking from WIPO to the WTO.
Had states refrained from linking the TRIPS Agreement to the other
items on the trade agenda, the negotiations over IP most likely would
have resembled a one-sided Prisoner's Dilemma, where developed
countries and developing countries would have had different strategy
sets and asymmetric payoffs. While the developing countries would
have had both offensive and defensive incentives to shirk their IP com-
mitments, the developed countries would have only defected defensive-
ly by resorting to trade sanctions in response to developing countries'
defection. 17 1 When states explicitly linked the TRIPS negotiations to
negotiations on agricultural and textile trade, they converted the one-
sided Prisoner's Dilemma to a more classical symmetrical Prisoner's
Dilemma, where the incentive to defect existed for both parties. Assum-
ing the other party's continuing cooperation, developed countries would
have obtained the highest individual payoff by defecting from their
commitment to cut down agricultural subsidies. Similarly, developing
countries would have obtained the highest individual payoff by defect-
ing from their IP commitments. Thus, from the outset, states' ability to
resort to the DSM to contain other states' incentives to defect motivated
the negotiation of the TRIPS agreement within the WTO.
Even when opportunistic behavior is likely - and, therefore, the
availability of sanctions is relevant - it is still unclear why a powerful
country would choose to pursue cooperation in the WTO instead of re-
sorting to unilateral retaliation. If the United States and the EU could
have pressured developing countries into adopting IP laws without of-
fering any trade concessions in return, why did they turn to the WTO?
Pursuing an agreement within the WTO seemed to create two disad-
170. Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of
TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 664 (1996).
171. The developing countries opposed enhanced IP protection and would have had the in-
centive to defect from the agreement if it was concluded without linkages to the trade agenda. The
developed countries, in contrast, had nothing to gain by defecting from the agreement. Thus,
while in a conventional Prisoner's Dilemma both players would gain the highest individual pay-
offs by defecting (as long as the other player cooperated), in a one-sided Prisoner's Dilemma, the
developed countries' best strategy is for both players to cooperate.
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vantages for the Great Powers: It forced them to offer transfer payments
to the developing countries in return for extracting IP commitments
from them, and it curtailed the Great Powers' ability to unilaterally re-
taliate by subjecting them to the WTO's DSM.
For instance, instead of forming linkages in the WTO, the United
States could have continued its previous practice of threatening devel-
oping countries with unilateral trade sanctions based on Section 301 of
the United States Trade Act of 1974.172 Similarly, the United States
could have threatened to withdraw developing countries' GSP privileg-
es.
Whether unilateral threats and sanctions are a better strategy than
linkages backed by the WTO's DSM for the United States or the EU
remains unclear. While there are examples of states offering higher lev-
els of IP protection under unilateral pressure from the Great Powers,
such threats and sanctions have not always been effective. Developing
countries have a mixed record of complying with threats in the IP do-
main, reducing the United States' and the EU's confidence that a mere
threat would be sufficient to bring about desired regulatory changes.
Meanwhile, aggressive unilateralism is also a costlier strategy to sustain
in the long run.173
2. The Self-Enforcing Nature of International Antitrust
Cooperation
Those who support a WTO antitrust agreement cite defection as an
important reason to pursue a binding agreement. The existing literature
seems to suggest that the strategic setting underlying international anti-
trust cooperation would have the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilem-
ma.174 Andrew Guzman, for instance, argues that in setting their domes-
172. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006) (granting the United States the authority to impose trade
sanctions against foreign countries that violate the United States' rights or benefits under trade
agreements or that engage in unjustifiable trade practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce).
173. Other accounts have also been offered to explain why the Great Powers might forgo uni-
lateralism in favor of WTO dispute settlement. Rachel Brewster, for instance, argues that the
United States' decision to forgo unilateral sanctions is explained by the President's efforts to gain
greater control vis-A-vis Congress over the content of U.S. trade policy. See generally Rachel
Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006).
Richard Steinberg has argued that Great Powers, including the United States and the EU, support
the consensus-based decision-making structures in the WiTO, even though those structures yield
more power for the weaker countries. According to him, current WTO rules create incentives for
all states to reveal their preferences honestly. This gain creates a valuable information flow to the
Great Powers, which can use the information to formulate proposals that reflect the interests of
powerful states yet are acceptable and ultimately considered legitimate by all members. Stein-
berg, supra note 16, at 342.
174. See Guzman, supra note 59, at 101 (implying that international antitrust cooperation
would resemble a Prisoner's Dilemma); see also Oliver Budzinski, Toward an International Gov-
ernance of Transborder Mergers? Competition Networks and Institutions Between Centralism
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tic antitrust laws, states "externalize the costs and internalize the bene-
fits of the exercise of market power across borders" to maximize their
national interest.'75 Guzman expects net-importer countries to employ
stricter-than-optimal antitrust standards, since these countries decline to
internalize costs that foreign producers bear as the target of strict anti-
trust laws.176 Conversely, net-exporter countries enact laxer-than-
optimal antitrust laws, since the costs of the lax enforcement fall on for-
eign consumers.177 The alleged existence of this type of "trade flow bi-
as" leads Guzman to conclude that a WTO antitrust agreement is neces-
sary to overcome these sub-optimal domestic antitrust laws.17 8 Guzman
also maintains that exemptions for domestic corporations (statutory bi-
as) and discriminatory enforcement practices vis-A-vis foreign corpora-
tions (enforcement bias) characterize domestic antitrust enforcement. 179
I have elsewhere developed a detailed argument for why trade flow
bias, statutory bias, or a notable enforcement bias do not drive antitrust
enforcement, and why states are, therefore, less likely to behave oppor-
tunistically when enforcing their domestic antitrust laws.' 8 0 The argu-
ment on the alleged trade flow bias appears least convincing. The exist-
ence of "effects doctrine" as a basis for antitrust jurisdiction limits
states' ability to engage in such a bias. No state enjoys exclusive juris-
diction over an antitrust case.' Regardless of the nationality or location
of a corporation, every state with an antitrust law may establish antitrust
jurisdiction on a corporation, so long as the anti-competitive conduct of
that corporation has an "effect" in the domestic market of that particular
country.182 Thus, the concurrent jurisdiction of the importing country
and Decentralism, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 6-8 (2004) (arguing that a non-coordinated
merger control regime can be characterized as a Prisoner's Dilemma); Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver
Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?, in COMPETITION LAWS IN
CONFLICT, supra note 59, at 31, 44 (making a brief reference to the Prisoner's Dilemma when
discussing the current decentralized antitrust regime).
175. Guzman, supra note 59, at 101.
176. Id. at 108-09. "Optimal" antitrust laws would be globally efficient, in that no state
would engage in over- or under-enforcement, but would choose the same antitrust laws as they
would absent trade flows.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 117-20.
179. Id. at 100.
180. Bradford, supra note 8, at 389-97.
181. Antitrust can, in this respect, be contrasted with, for example, corporate law, where the
internal affairs of the corporation are regulated exclusively by the laws of the state where the cor-
poration was established.
182. The United States and the EU in particular have applied their antitrust laws to the con-
duct of foreign corporations as long the conduct has had an "effect" on their domestic markets.
See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945); Case T-
102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 89-92. However, many other nations
today recognize the legitimacy of applying their antitrust laws to the conduct of foreign firms as
long as some anti-competitive effect is felt on the market of the country willing to exercise juris-
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compromises a net-exporting country's ability to strategically enact
overly lax antitrust laws that give a free pass to its exporters.
The arguments regarding alleged statutory bias seem more plausible,
but a closer examination of domestic antitrust statutes illustrates that
this type of bias is rare in practice. Domestic antitrust statutes do not
explicitly favor local firms over foreign ones. Several jurisdictions do,
however, exempt export cartels from their antitrust laws, 183 which could
amount to an example of a statutory bias.184 An importing country can,
nonetheless, mitigate the opportunistic antitrust policies of export cartel
exemptions. If the cartel adversely affects competition in the importer's
domestic market, the importing country can always target the export
cartel under its own antitrust laws.'85 The country exempting export car-
tels from its jurisdiction cannot, therefore, effectively shield its cartel
from another country's antitrust investigation. Moreover, since export
cartel exemptions are increasingly rare today, they are unlikely to sig-
nificantly impede competition and international trade.' 86 Consequently,
any Prisoner's Dilemma incentives of export cartels hinder international
antitrust cooperation marginally, at most.
It seems conceivable that antitrust enforcers might deliberately over-
look the anti-competitive conduct of domestic corporations in individual
instances while disproportionately targeting foreign corporations. Sus-
picions in this regard were reinforced when the EU prohibited a pro-
posed acquisition involving two U.S.-based companies, Honeywell and
General Electric, after U.S. authorities had already approved the acqui-
diction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415
reporters' note 9 (1987).
183. Export cartel refers to an agreement or other arrangement between two or more firms to
charge a specified export price or to divide export markets among them. The difference from a
normal cartel is that the collusive behavior is restricted to goods or services that are exported to
foreign markets.
184. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, The Changing International Status of
Export Cartel Exemptions, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 785, 800-06 (2005) (examining export cartel
exemptions in fifty-five countries and finding that seventeen of them, including the United States,
had explicit exemptions; thirty-four, including almost all members of the EU, had implicit exemp-
tions; and only four, including Russia, had no exemptions).
185. EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
1101 (2007). This argument, however, makes the assumption that the importing country is vested
with adequate enforcement capacity, an assumption that may be problematic if evidence required
to prosecute the export cartel is located in the exporting jurisdiction or if the importing jurisdic-
tion cannot impose effective remedies.
186. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 184, at 793. Levenstein and Suslow note that over
the last three decades, the number of export cartel exemptions has declined from 180 to zero in
Japan, from sixty-nine to four in Australia, and from 227 to zero in Germany. Id. at 816-18. The
only country that continues to provide a large number of exemptions is the United States. See
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2006); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4001-21 (2006).
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sition in 2001.18 The EU's decision reinforced accusations that the EU
antitrust enforcement protected European interests and was hostile to-
ward U.S. corporations. A broader inquiry into the EU antitrust authori-
ties' merger decisions, however, does not reveal any systematic bias
against U.S. corporations. In fact, while twenty-five percent of the mer-
ger notifications that the EU Commission received from 1995 to 2005
involved at least one U.S.-based company, only twelve percent of the
prohibited mergers involved a U.S. corporation.'88 Similarly, only sev-
enteen percent of the mergers that were withdrawn after the notification
involved a U.S. corporation, twenty-six percent of the Commission's
phase II investigations (second requests) involved a U.S. corporation,
and twenty-seven percent of the conditional clearances were granted in
cases that involved a U.S. company.1 89 These numbers suggest that any
enforcement bias would be limited to a small number of individual cas-
es, or even that enforcement bias may not exist.
In the absence of strong incentives for opportunistic behavior, the ex-
istence of a distributional problem, as opposed to a defection problem,
has obstructed international antitrust cooperation. 190 The distributional
problem arises when an international antitrust agreement would uneven-
ly distribute the costs and benefits among states. In this coordination
game setting, states expect to benefit from a coordinated global antitrust
regime but fail to agree on the type of regime they ought to adopt. This
conflict over the focal point of coordination makes an agreement diffi-
cult to reach.
For instance, both the United States and the EU acknowledge that a
more harmonized international antitrust regime could reduce transaction
costs and increase economic efficiency and legal certainty. Both powers
expect to benefit from a more effective pursuit of international cartels
and dominant companies whose conduct span across several markets.
Similarly, harmonized merger control procedures would decrease trans-
action costs, diminish delays, and improve legal certainty, since corpo-
rations would not face multiple jurisdictions with different substantive
and procedural antitrust regimes. Thus, one assumes that international
coordination generates aggregate and individual benefits for both the
United States and the EU. The two antitrust powers, however, disagree
as to the precise content and form of the international agreement. 191
187. See Dep't of Justice Press Release, supra note 95; General Electric/Honeywell Commis-
sion Decision, supra note 95.
188. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 397.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 385, 399, 414-22.
191. The EU has been the strongest advocate of WTO antitrust rules, whereas the United
States has endorsed voluntary antitrust cooperation within the ICN. See ICPAC Report, supra
note 98, at 33-34; Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy;
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While the United States would like all countries to converge to the U.S.
antitrust laws, the EU prefers convergence to its own antitrust laws.
This distributional problem undermines their ability to pursue coordina-
tion, despite the gains that coordination is expected to produce. Thus,
international antitrust cooperation resembles a coordination game with
distributional consequences rather than a Prisoner's Dilemma. 92
The distributional conflict between developed countries and develop-
ing countries similarly stems from the disagreement over the content of
the contemplated international antitrust agreement. While developed
countries call for a reduction of transaction costs and enhanced market
access, developing countries are concerned about their inability to con-
trol the anti-competitive practices of multinational corporations and the
need to shield their local corporations from international competition.193
Thus, the coordination game between developed countries and develop-
ing countries can be formalized in a manner similar to the game be-
tween the United States and the EU, each game resulting in two possible
equilibria.
Unlike in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, where a state can obtain a
higher individual payoff by deviating from agreed commitments, an
agreement that states have attained in a coordination game setting is
largely self-enforcing, since neither party has an incentive to renege on
its commitments. Once states reach an agreement, sustaining coopera-
tion in a coordination game is easier than in a Prisoner's Dilemma due
to the absence of incentives to cheat. The low likelihood of opportunis-
tic behavior also renders any formal enforcement mechanism less use-
ful. Assuming that international antitrust cooperation indeed predomi-
nantly resembles a coordination game rather than a Prisoner's Dilemma,
the WTO's DSM should be of limited relevance for antitrust negotia-
tions. Thus, it is not surprising that states allowed the WTO antitrust ne-
gotiations to fail and instead focused their efforts on the pursuit of non-
binding antitrust cooperation outside of the WTO framework.
Two caveats are in order. First, while deliberate cheating is likely to
be rare, developing countries' capacity constraints, including a lack of
supra note 96; Kolasky, supra note 98; Monti, supra note 96.
192. Bradford, supra note 8, at 385, 399, 414-22. For a potential solution to international an-
titrust enforcement that avoids this coordination problem by judicial reliance on foreign judicial
factual findings of cartels, see generally Michal S. Gal, Free Movement ofJudgments: Increasing
Deterrence of International Cartels Through Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 57
(2010).
193. Bernard M. Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, International Cooperation on Domestic Policies:
Lessons from the WTO Competition Policy Debate, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 439, 446 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds.,
2006); Ajit Singh & Rahule Dhumale, Competition Policy, Development, and Developing Coun-
tries, in WHAT GLOBAL EcoNOMIC CRISiS? 122, 127 (Philip Arestis, Michelle Baddeley & John
McCombie eds., 2001).
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enforcement institutions and antitrust expertise, might lead to an occa-
sional unintentional defection from international antitrust commitments.
Nevertheless, to the extent that defection can be traced to capacity con-
straints rather than intentional violation of the agreement, a binding
agreement with enforcement provisions would be unlikely to bring
greater compliance. Capacity building in the form of technical assis-
tance is likely to yield better results vis-fi-vis developing countries
whose inadequate regulatory capacities renders compliance with the
contemplated agreement difficult.194 Second, occasional intentional de-
fection can occur in a coordination game if a state wants to shift the
point of coordination to its preferred equilibrium.' 95 One can distinguish
this type of defection from cheating in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation,
however, as the defecting state in a coordination game setting deliber-
ately makes its defection public in an effort to force other states to move
to the new equilibrium.
Accordingly, in the case of antitrust cooperation, the primary concern
was and remains how to overcome the distributional conflict in the first
place, not how to deter defection and sustain the focal point of coordina-
tion once states have settled on one. This provided states with a ra-
tionale for steering away from the WTO and its DSM. When the strate-
gic situation will likely limit opportunistic behavior, states consider
non-binding agreements adequate, especially since such agreements are
often faster and less expensive to negotiate.
3. Concluding Remarks on the Enforcement Explanation
The negotiation history of the TRIPS Agreement illustrates the intrin-
sic value that the WTO can add to the process of negotiating interna-
tional agreements. The primary advantage of negotiating an agreement
under the auspices of the WTO lies in the institution's ability to solve a
Prisoner's Dilemma. Absent the ability to exchange credible and en-
forceable commitments, states would pursue sub-optimal policies in a
Prisoner's Dilemma setting. Thus, negotiating the TRIPS Agreement
within the WTO gave states the necessary guarantees on other states'
future behavior, leading all states to abandon their dominant, non-
cooperative strategies and move toward an equilibrium that maximized
194. See Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175,
194 (1993). The authors' argument for a "managerial model of compliance," which rests on
transparency, capacity building, and persuasion rather than on enforcement and sanctions, seems
particularly suitable for ratcheting up antitrust standards in developing countries.
195. See Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 INT'L ORG. 765, 776
(1992) (distinguishing this type of departure from the established equilibrium from cheating, as
the defecting state would need to make the defection public in order to force other states to move
towards the new equilibrium).
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social welfare. In contrast, the WTO does not add similar value to the
pursuit of antitrust convergence in a coordination game setting where
states always have the incentive to pursue a strategy that maximizes so-
cial welfare. Either focal point in the coordination game constitutes a
Pareto-optimal outcome. While the WTO might help states choose be-
tween the two focal points, the strategic structure of the coordination
game does not utilize the greatest institutional advantage of the WTO -
its ability to enforce compliance.
E. Cost-Benefit Explanation: Are the Net Benefits of Cooperation
and the Opportunity Costs ofNon-Cooperation High?
As shown above, the benefits of the TRIPS Agreement were extreme-
ly high for the developed countries, which were the unambiguous bene-
ficiaries of the Agreement. Similarly, the discussion below reveals that
the opportunity costs of not cooperating in the intellectual property do-
main in the WTO were much higher than the costs of maintaining a de-
centralized antitrust regime. Thus, the difference in the net benefits of
WTO cooperation and the opportunity costs of forgoing WTO negotia-
tions further explains the successful conclusion of the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the failure to reach a WTO antitrust agreement.
1. The High Benefits of the TRIPS Agreement and the Absence of
Alternatives
In the case of the TRIPS negotiations, the stakes were high and the
alternatives were few. It is virtually impossible for states to rely on their
domestic IP laws to curtail abuses of IP rights that take place outside of
their jurisdictions. Multilateral solutions were therefore indispensable.
At the same time, multilateral venues prior to the TRIPS Agreement
proved inadequate.196 Indeed, it was their dissatisfaction with WIPO
that led the Great Powers and their domestic interest groups to demand
an alternative regime.197 Most importantly, WIPO lacked the tools for
effective enforcement, which increased the relative attractiveness of ne-
gotiating the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO. 98
At times, international institutions are not necessary for achieving
greater convergence. Some areas of cooperation are conducive to "mar-
ket-based harmonization" whereby states' regulatory regimes converge
196. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Norms, and International Intellectual Property Law, 28
MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 129 (2006).
197. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 323, 356-365 (2004).
198. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual
Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187,
1204-05 (2009).
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even if there is no international agreement that calls for such conver-
gence. Beth Simmons has demonstrated how the interplay between two
variables - the extent of negative externalities and the countries' incen-
tives to emulate - determine whether formal legal institutions are nec-
essary for achieving convergence.199 Her model assumes that there is a
"dominant center," which is often a Great Power that is a primary regu-
lator in the field.200 In the case of IP regulation, the dominant center
consists of the United States and the EU. If the decentralized regulatory
framework creates negative externalities, the United States and the EU
are expected to want the other countries to converge to the regulatory
model that they embrace. If the United States and the EU seek harmoni-
zation, they have the choice of pursuing cooperation within an interna-
tional institution, such as the WTO, or waiting for other countries to ad-
just to the U.S.-EU regulatory framework with little, if any, institutional
pressure. A chosen strategy hinges on the other countries' incentives to
emulate the dominant powers' regulation. With a high incentive to emu-
late, institutions are not necessary. But, with a low incentive to emulate,
institutions are central in bringing about the desired convergence.
In the case of TRIPS, the extent of negative externalities stemming
from developing countries' inadequate IP protection was extremely
high. At the same time, developing countries had very low incentives to
emulate the United States and the EU, given that strong IP protection
would impose costs and offer no benefits to the developing countries.
Efforts to achieve IP convergence therefore demonstrate a prime exam-
ple of regulatory convergence that is driven though institutions - here,
through centralized pressure at the WTO.
2. The Low Net Benefits of the WTO Antitrust Agreement and the
Existence ofAlternatives
States had a much higher tolerance for the status quo in the case of
antitrust than in the case of IP cooperation. I have elsewhere argued that
one of the reasons that antitrust negotiations have failed in the WTO is
that states perceived the agreement to generate low net benefits.201
Compared to the TRIPS Agreement, which many considered a high-
stakes agreement for its proponents, the antitrust agreement's low -
and in any event, more uncertain - expected benefits relative to the
costs of negotiating the agreement in the WTO tempered enthusiasm for
it.
199. Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Mar-
ket Regulation, 55 INT'L ORG. 589 (2001).
200. See id. at 591-92.
201. See generally Bradford, supra note 8, at 401-05 (discussing deadlock as a reason for the
collapse of negotiations).
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A WTO agreement is more likely if it provides states with large ben-
efits at a relatively low cost. The reason states may have concluded that
the pursuit of international antitrust cooperation in the WTO would not
render high net benefits comes from three factors. First, the extent of
aggregate benefits available from cooperation is uncertain and possibly
not as great as many commentators presume. Second, adjustment costs
under a binding international agreement are likely to be high, particular-
ly in comparison to the uncertain benefits stemming from cooperation.
Third, the opportunity costs of non-cooperation are relatively low, par-
ticularly for the key states with strong domestic antitrust laws.
With respect to the aggregate benefits from cooperation, many com-
mentators advocating binding international antitrust rules presume that
such rules would lead to significant transaction-cost savings. 202 Alt-
hough intuitively appealing, studies have yet to demonstrate this pre-
sumption empirically. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify
the current regime's inefficiencies, recent research suggests that at least
some of these costs may have been exaggerated. For example, a recent
survey of international mergers calls into question the commonly held
view that the multi-jurisdictional merger review would lead to signifi-
cant transaction costs. 203 Another study suggests that anti-competitive
practices may not constitute significant strategic non-tariff barriers, de-
spite common beliefs to the contrary. 204 Furthermore, while a few high-
profile cases, including the prohibited acquisition involving GE and
202. See Guzman, supra note 59, at 100-01; Charles A. James, U.S. Enforcement Agency
Perspectives on the International Competition Network, 16 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (2001); Daniel K.
Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 482, 504
(2000); Monti, supra note 96; Konrad von Finckenstein, Comm'r of Competition, Canadian
Competition Bureau, International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or Multilateralism?, Ad-
dress to Joint Meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and Canadian
Bar Association National Competition Law Section (May 31, 2001), available at
http://tinyurl.com/28wyh6m. See generally ICPAC REPORT, supra note 98, at 91; NOTIFICATION
AND PROCEDURES SUBGROUP, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE
COSTS AND BURDENS OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL MERGER REVIEW 10-12 (2004),
http://tinyurl.com/2buondh.
203. See generally MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER SURVEY, supra note 133. The survey of
over sixty international M&A deals in 2003 found that "a typical international merger is worth
63.9 [-$5.1] billion, requires six filings with a merger review authority and generates on average
E3.3. [-$4.3] million in external merger review costs - it takes an average of seven months to
complete." Int'l Bar Ass'n, IBA/ABA Survey Identifies Costs to Business of Competition Refer-
rals on Cross-Border M&A Deals (June 23, 2003), http://tinyurl.com/25ef4e2.
204. See generally Diane Manifold & William Donnelly, A Compilation from Multiple
Sources of Reported Measures Which May Affect Trade, in QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF NON-TARIFF MEASURES AND TRADE FACILITATION 41 (Philippa
Dee & Michael Ferrantino eds., 2005) (discussing data collected by the U.S. International Trade
Commission on the relative harmfulness of various non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that are expected to
impede the free flow of goods and services, which implies that government-tolerated anti-
competitive practices do not constitute a major market access barrier, at least relative to other
NTBs that governments have at their disposal to deter entry).
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Honeywell 205 or the contested merger between Boeing and McDonnell-
Douglas,206 have heightened fears of inconsistent decisions by different
antitrust authorities, enforcement conflicts rarely appear in practice.207
Finally, the low prevalence of national bias in domestic antitrust en-
forcement, as Part II.D claims above, further diminishes the benefits of
a WTO antitrust agreement. 208
Negotiating and implementing a binding WTO antitrust agreement
would also be costly, thus reducing the net benefits from its success.
The contracting costs of pursuing a binding agreement under the auspi-
ces of the WTO would be significant due to the numerous parties, mul-
tiple negotiation rounds, and extensive multi-issue bargaining that
would likely be required.209 In addition, the compliance costs of imple-
menting and enforcing international antitrust rules would be high, in
particular for developing countries that lack the institutional capacity,
technical expertise, and financial resources to establish sophisticated an-
titrust regimes. Similar costs were also present in the TRIPS negotia-
tions. In the case of TRIPS, however, higher benefits for the key parties
of the negotiations more than offset these costs.
Despite the high costs of negotiating a WTO antitrust agreement, one
might argue that the costs of pursuing cooperation outside of the WTO
could be even higher. Non-binding antitrust cooperation today consists
of a myriad of different bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral govern-
ance instruments,210 all typically focusing only on some subset of sub-
stantive or procedural antitrust matters. While various non-binding
agreements may involve relatively low contracting costs individually,
the number of different non-binding agreements that would be neces-
sary to cover the range of issues and parties that a potential WTO
agreement could embrace would be high. These multiple non-binding
205. See Dep't of Justice Press Release, supra note 95.
206. Commission Decision of 30 July 1997, 97/816/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16; Joint State-
ment Closing Investigation of the Proposed Merger, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 24,295 (July 1,
1997).
207. The GE/Honeywell decision remains the only merger case in which the United States
and EU authorities reached a conflicting decision. The EU also prohibited a proposed merger be-
tween DeHavilland and ATR, which was approved by the Canadian authorities. Commission De-
cision of 2 Oct. 1991, 91/619/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42. Legal uncertainty resulting from multi-
jurisdictional merger review is thus unlikely to form as significant negative externality as the the-
oretical possibility of enforcement conflicts would suggest. It is, however, difficult to evaluate the
costs of the existing prospect - no matter how unlikely in practice - that any given merger has
a higher risk of being prohibited as a result of multiple regulatory reviews.
208. Bradford, supra note 8, at 397 (referring to statistics on EU merger control practices and
arguing that they do not show national bias against U.S. corporations); see supra Part II.D.
209. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 434; see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.
210. Plurilateral agreements are between a limited number of states, but more than two,
whereas multilateral agreements are between a great number of states. See DEARDORFF, supra
note 15, at 210.
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instruments among different parties, taken together, could be more cost-
ly than a single binding international antitrust agreement, assuming such
an agreement was feasible to negotiate. At the same time, while the ex
post costs of a single, all-embracing, and successfully concluded WTO
grand bargain could be lower than a myriad of separate single-issue
agreements, states perceive the ex ante risk-adjusted costs of multi-issue
negotiations to be significantly higher. This is particularly true given the
greater likelihood of failure in such negotiations and the costs involved
in the collapse of a large-scale negotiation agenda.
Finally, the opportunity costs in the absence of a WTO antitrust
agreement are distinctly low due to the variety of other solutions availa-
ble for states. States with existing, well-functioning antitrust regimes are
often able to exercise jurisdiction vis-A-vis foreign corporations as long
as the allegedly anti-competitive conduct of the corporations has an ef-
fect on their domestic market.2 11 Both the United States and the EU
have resorted to extraterritorial enforcement on several occasions.212
This ability to engage in extraterritorial enforcement makes the case for
an international agreement less compelling. States can also solve many
of the collective action problems through bilateral cooperation agree-
ments and existing informal cooperation mechanisms. These alternative
forms of antitrust cooperation have enhanced international cooperation,
aligned domestic antitrust laws, and contributed to the significant prolif-
eration of antitrust regimes around the world.213 At the same time, these
alternative regimes have further reduced the need for a binding interna-
tional antitrust regime.
Thus, antitrust cooperation is an issue area that is conducive to mar-
ket-based harmonization. The extent of the negative externalities that
decentralized antitrust regimes generate is uncertain and, in any event,
likely to be lower than it was in the case of the decentralized IP regime.
In addition, developing countries and emerging markets have an incen-
tive to emulate more established antitrust regimes. They have actively
sought to copy developed countries' antitrust laws in order to strengthen
the operation of their domestic markets and to curtail anti-competitive
conduct of multinational corporations that conduct business in their
markets.214 In some areas of antitrust, where there seem to be more ob-
vious negative externalities, states complement market-based harmoni-
211. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Joined Cases
89, 104, 114, 116, 117, and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahistrom Osakeyhti6 and Others v. Comm'n, 1988
E.C.R. 5193.
212. See, e.g., Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796; Ahlstrom, 1988 E.C.R. 3. Obviously, the status
quo option entails some transaction costs (including the possibility of enforcement conflicts akin
to the GE/Honeywell case).
213. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 404-05; Budzinski, supra note 5; Jenny, supra note 5.
214. See Sell, supra note 17, at 318-19.
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zation with "softer" institutional assistance, such as developing non-
binding guidelines and best practices within institutions like the Interna-
tional Competition Network. In either case, antitrust cooperation does
not seem to call for strong, centralized cooperation in the WTO.
Consequently, while a binding international antitrust agreement
would likely create benefits in the form of transactional efficiencies, the
high costs of WTO cooperation - together with limited expected gains
and the availability of alternatives - explain why states have chosen to
pursue other regulatory priorities in the WTO while preferring other
paths when seeking international antitrust convergence.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to explain when an international legal
framework like the WTO can facilitate international cooperation.
Through an empirical enquiry into IP and antitrust cooperation, it has
endeavored to provide a nuanced understanding of the limits of the
WTO's expansion to new areas of regulatory cooperation.
By contrasting the successfully concluded TRIPS Agreement with
the failed antitrust negotiations, this Article has challenged the prevail-
ing view that the TRIPS Agreement offers an instructive precedent for
antitrust negotiations in the WTO. A closer examination of the strategic
situation underlying the TRIPS and antitrust negotiations reveals that
the two areas of cooperation have little in common.
The strategic situations that characterize IP and international antitrust
cooperation differ in several ways. First, the general preconditions that
underlie all successful efforts to cooperate internationally were present
in the TRIPS negotiations, but not in the antitrust negotiations. While
the Great Powers unanimously supported the TRIPS Agreement, a com-
parable consensus was lacking in the case of antitrust. Similarly, influ-
ential interest groups within the Great Powers supported the TRIPS
Agreement but showed little enthusiasm for the antitrust agreement. In
the absence of political rents that major trading powers could capture,
the likelihood of reaching an antitrust agreement was dim.
In addition, the WTO's institutional advantages were directly rele-
vant to the TRIPS Agreement, but these strengths did little to solve the
problems underlying international antitrust cooperation. In particular,
issue linkages could rectify the unequal distributional consequences of
the TRIPS Agreement. Similar linkages could not solve the antitrust ne-
gotiations because of ex ante uncertainty regarding the winners and los-
ers under the prospective antitrust agreement. Additionally, the risk of
opportunism and the consequent need for an enforcement mechanism
was prevalent in the case of TRIPS, but it was trivial in the case of anti-
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trust. The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism was, therefore, ger-
mane to the TRIPS negotiations but only marginally useful to the anti-
trust negotiations. Finally, in the case of TRIPS, both the net benefits of
cooperation and the opportunity costs of non-cooperation within the
WTO were high because there were few alternative regulatory regimes,
while the opposite was true for the antitrust agreement. Taken together,
these reasons contributed to the successful conclusion of the TRIPS
Agreement and the failure of antitrust negotiations in the WTO.
The inquiry into the differences between IP and antitrust cooperation
also calls into question the conventional wisdom that the TRIPS
Agreement provides a useful template for WTO negotiations in other
areas of regulatory cooperation. Many have presumed that the dynamics
underlying antitrust cooperation are most similar to those underlying IP
cooperation, making antitrust the most obvious next issue for the WTO
to incorporate into its framework. Yet, despite the similarity of antitrust
to trade, efforts to coordinate antitrust policy through the WTO have
failed. This suggests that a careful inquiry into the strategic situation
characterizing the regulation of corruption, investment, labor, or the en-
vironment is necessary before one can assume that the WTO can incor-
porate these other issues by following the example set by the TRIPS
Agreement. Rather than providing a template for future negotiations, it
may be more appropriate to view the TRIPS Agreement as a product of
an idiosyncratic set of conditions that are unlikely to be replicated in
other areas of cooperation.
Disaggregating the conditions that make cooperation in the WTO
feasible is also helpful when looking at the future prospects of such co-
operation. States' ability to cooperate within the WTO is likely to be-
come increasingly difficult in the future, suggesting that the failed anti-
trust negotiations may be more predictive than the TRIPS negotiations
on the future boundaries of the WTO. The political economy landscape
underlying WTO negotiations is becoming increasingly complex, un-
dermining the conditions that made WTO agreements feasible in the
past. This complexity influences each of the key variables of the WTO's
success that are identified above.
For instance, Great Power consensus is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to establish and sustain. The formerly tight U.S.-EU alliance has
gradually weakened since the end of the Cold War.215 This has had an
impact on all areas of cooperation, including trade.216 The United
States' and the EU's capacity to exercise leadership has also declined
due to a growing domestic resistance to the WTO's agenda in both
215. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The End of the Big Trade Deal: Why Doha Will Be the Last of the
Grand Multilateral Trade Negotiations, INT'L ECON., Summer 2006, at 46, 48.
216. See id.
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countries. Consequently, the United States' and the EU's increasingly
limited abilities to secure domestic ratification for WTO agreements
have forced them to retract from their active roles as drivers of WTO
217
cooperation.
Achieving consensus among the Great Powers has also become more
complicated, as China and other emerging economies have begun to
challenge the United States' and the EU's economic dominance. A
U.S.-EU accord is likely to remain a necessary, but no longer sufficient,
precondition for a WTO agreement. Instead, a greater number of in-
creasingly heterogeneous states must reach a consensus as the emerging
trade powers weigh in more forcefully when setting the negotiation
agenda and bargaining over the terms of the specific agreements. China
and India, for instance, have already been able to block progress in
WTO negotiations where proposed agreements fail to incorporate their
interests and priorities. At the same time, they have shown little will-
ingness to step in and assume a genuine leadership role in moving WTO
negotiations forward.218
Future negotiations within the WTO may face an additional challenge
if powerful interest groups that benefit from trade liberalization shift
their lobbying activity to other venues. Given the recent difficulties in
moving forward with the Doha Round of trade talks, pressure groups
might increasingly perceive the WTO as no longer apt to open global
markets. Instead, they may urge their governments to negotiate bilateral
and regional agreements, which are faster, more certain, and more man-
ageable to negotiate. During the past eight years - while the Doha ne-
gotiations have been hobbling along fruitlessly - bilateral and regional
trade agreements have continued to proliferate. 219 These agreements
have further lowered the opportunity costs of non-WTO agreements, re-
inforcing the shift from global trade deals to regional and bilateral ones.
Another reason behind United States and EU multinational corpora-
tions' vanishing support for the WTO process is that these companies
217. See id.
218. See John W. Miller, Global Trade Talks Fail As New Giants Flex Muscle, WALL ST. J.,
July 30, 2008, at Al; Andrew L. Stoler, China's Role in the World Trade Organization and the
Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Institute for International Trade, Second World
Forum on China Studies 9-12 (Sept. 21-22, 2006), available at http://tinyurl.com/2f696so.
219. Over three hundred bilateral and regional trade agreements have been negotiated by
members of the WTO. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 69, at 63; World Trade
Organization, Regional Trade Agreements, http://tinyurl.com/2frke46 (listing all regional trade
agreements that have been notified to the World Trade Organization); Pascal Lamy, Director-
General, World Trade Org., Regional Agreements: The "Pepper" in the Multilateral "Curry,"
Speech Before the Confederation of Indian Industries (Jan. 17, 2007), available at
http://tinyurl.com/28mx3e7 (recognizing that regional trade agreements have a role to play, but
insisting that members report all such agreements to the WTO and comply with certain rules to
ensure consistency with WTO principles).
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have already managed to reap the most important benefits of trade liber-
alization. The past success of the WTO has delivered essentially all of
the market opening that these powers need. 220 These stakeholders were
once the most vocal supporters of the WTO's agenda; today, the loudest
domestic voices are exercised by consumers and interest groups critical
of the recent advances the WTO has made in intervening with domestic
regulatory policies such as IP protection and public health.221
Issue linkages are also likely to become riskier and more difficult in
the subsequent WTO rounds. The "single undertaking" approach to
WTO negotiations with multiple issue linkages has been a creative and,
at times, effective way of bringing controversial issues within the WTO.
Insistence on package deals has ensured that states have signed on to
agreements that fail to deliver direct benefits for them so long as they
have been compensated in another area. As the number of players and
complexity of negotiation agendas increases, however, so does the pos-
sibility of compromises unraveling. Thus, as an even greater number of
increasingly heterogeneous players seek compromises, the single under-
taking approach is becoming a questionable strategy for success.
The best argument for the continuing relevance of the WTO stems
from its internationally unique ability to enforce legally binding com-
mitments. Opportunistic behavior continues to characterize many areas
of cooperation, and it is unlikely that protectionist tendencies will ever
vanish altogether. A compelling argument, however, can be made that
the cooperation dilemmas underlying international trade issues today
rarely resemble a Prisoner's Dilemma. For instance, the question of
whether imposing antidumping duties on Chinese products only hurts
the Chinese and improves the United States' terms of trade is no longer
unambiguous. Such duties also hurt the U.S. companies in China that
export their products back to the United States. Similarly, given the rap-
id increase in trade in intermediate goods,222 duties on Chinese inputs
also hurt the U.S. companies that buy and incorporate those Chinese in-
puts into their final products. Thus, the "unbundling" of the production
220. Tarullo, supra note 215, at 48.
221. For instance, the previously staunch coalition supporting the TRIPS Agreement has
faced an emergence of a powerful counter-coalition that opposes the Agreement. As the magni-
tude of the HIV epidemic became more evident and, consequently, the question of access to af-
fordable medicine more urgent, new interest groups demanding changes to the TRIPS Agreement
were mobilized to counter the impact of the powerful IP lobby. As a result, the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was adopted. These groups may present setbacks for
the TRIPS agenda earlier advanced by the Great Powers and the multinational corporations within
those powers. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health of 14 November 2001, VT/MIN(01)/DECIW/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
222. This includes intra-industry and intra-firm trade. For instance, both the United States and
the EU may be producing the same product and trading among themselves within the same sector.
Intra-firm trade refers to a firm that is trading products and components among its subsidiaries.
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chain has challenged the perception of many states and interest groups
that opportunistic behavior and protectionism serve their interests. 223 It
has also paved the way for unilateral trade liberalization, challenging
the conventional assumption that protectionist impulses always impede
international trade and that hard law and threats of sanctions are re-
quired to curtail such impulses.
Finally, while some attempts to conclude the Doha Round have failed
because there were too many controversial issues, more recent rounds
have failed partly because of the lack of inclusion of issues that would
provide satisfactory net gains to all parties. The Doha negotiation agen-
da has now been stripped of much of its initial ambition, as states have
narrowed the agenda in an effort to save the failing round. Thus, when
states perceive the net benefits of a WTO round as inadequate, they are
likely to abandon the WTO and pursue more substantial commitments
with a smaller group of like-minded trading partners.
Going forward, where does this leave the prospect of cooperation
within the WTO? One possibility is that governments have already
picked the low-hanging fruit and thereby satisfied the most salient needs
of their powerful interest groups, leaving a dwindling pool of uncertain
and contested benefits for states to negotiate. These remaining benefits
are also more difficult for distinctly heterogonous trade powers to agree
upon. This situation would marginalize the WTO's role with respect to
future liberalization commitments and leave the institution in the role of
adjudicating disputes stemming from existing agreements.224 This sce-
nario suggests that the WTO may well have met its limits and that we
are unlikely to see states incorporate new agreements into its frame-
work.
Another scenario is that the gains available through bilateral and re-
gional trade agreements do not make the WTO obsolete. Under this sce-
nario, one assumes that protectionism resurges and continues to span
across global markets. States erect new trade barriers. Eliminating them
creates losers and causes resistance, which only the WTO's facilitation
of transfer payments can overcome. Opportunistic behavior continues to
characterize many areas of cooperation. In these areas, the WTO is like-
ly to remain a useful forum in which to negotiate enforceable commit-
ments among many states. Indeed, states have few alternatives to the
WTO. This view predicts that the WTO will remain the central pillar of
the world trade system and continue to attract the negotiation of new is-
sues under its umbrella. If states continue to seek trade liberalization
through the WTO, however, they need to carefully weigh the costs and
223. See Joost Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 559,
562-63, 567-68 (2008).
224. Id. at 565.
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benefits of its current decision-making structures, including its insist-
ence on the single undertaking and its requirement that all states need to
sign on to all agreements.
Under either scenario, the WTO's recent inability to further its liber-
alization agenda highlights the need for a more focused debate on the
institution's capabilities, goals, and priorities. The future prospects for
cooperation within the WTO continue to hinge on the WTO's perceived
relevance in maintaining and strengthening free trade. The discussion
above not only helps shed light on the WTO's ability to foster interna-
tional agreements thus far, but it may also provide a starting point for a
discussion on whether and how the institution might serve states' future
needs in an increasingly complex economic and political landscape.
